A baseline review found that standard developer accounts are local administrators, unsigned tools can run from user profile folders, and reimaged systems still end up with unauthorized persistence. Which two changes best improve hardening while preserving developer work? Select two.
Removing local administrator rights from standard user accounts enforces least privilege by ensuring that malicious processes or accidental misconfigurations cannot write to protected system directories or modify security settings. Without local admin privileges, common persistence mechanisms like service creation, scheduled task manipulation, and registry run keys become far more difficult to implement. This control also contains the impact of a compromised session, limiting what an attacker can accomplish while still requiring them to find a separate privilege escalation vulnerability.
Why this answer
Removing local administrator rights from standard developer accounts enforces the principle of least privilege (PoLP). This prevents developers from making unauthorized system-wide changes, such as installing unsigned tools or creating persistence mechanisms, while still allowing them to perform their work with standard user permissions. This directly addresses the baseline review finding that standard developer accounts are local administrators, which is a common security misconfiguration.
Exam trap
The trap here is that candidates may think removing admin rights alone is sufficient, but the question requires two changes that best improve hardening while preserving developer work, and application allowlisting (Option B) is the second critical control to block unsigned tools from running in user profile folders, which removal of admin rights alone does not address.