A security engineer is designing a DMZ for a web server that must be accessible from the internet. The web server needs to query an internal database server. Which network security approach best limits exposure?
This provides proper segmentation and least privilege.
Why this answer
It implements a true DMZ architecture: the web server resides in the DMZ (a semi-trusted zone) while the database server remains in the internal network, protected by a firewall that permits only specific traffic (e.g., TCP/3306 for MySQL or TCP/1433 for MSSQL) from the web server. This minimizes the attack surface by ensuring that even if the web server is compromised, the database server is not directly reachable from the internet, and the firewall enforces strict stateful inspection and access control.
Exam trap
ISC2 often tests the misconception that placing both servers in the DMZ simplifies security, but the trap is that the database server should never be in the DMZ because it contains sensitive data and must be isolated behind an additional firewall layer to enforce defense in depth.
How to eliminate wrong answers
Option A is wrong because allowing all traffic from the internet to the internal network bypasses any security boundary, exposing the entire internal network to direct attack and violating the principle of least privilege. Option B is wrong because placing both servers in the same subnet with a firewall allowing all traffic eliminates network segmentation; if the web server is compromised, the database server is on the same broadcast domain and can be attacked laterally without any firewall restriction. Option C is wrong because placing the database server in the DMZ with the web server exposes the database to the internet (even if indirectly), as the DMZ is a less trusted zone; an attacker who compromises the web server can then directly access the database without traversing an additional firewall layer.