A Linux host is patched, but the scanner still flags the package as vulnerable. The vendor advisory says the distribution backported the fix, so the package version did not change. What should the analyst do before closing the ticket?
A version number alone can be misleading when a vendor backports a fix without changing the upstream version. The analyst should confirm the remediation using vendor notes, package release metadata, or other authoritative evidence. That ensures the finding is truly remediated before the ticket is closed and prevents a false assumption based only on a scanner result.
Why this answer
When a vendor backports a security fix to an older package version without incrementing the version number, the vulnerability scanner may still flag the package based on its version string. The analyst must verify the vendor advisory and package metadata (e.g., using `rpm -q --changelog` or `dpkg --status`) to confirm the fix is present, then document this evidence to close the ticket with proper justification.
Exam trap
The trap here is that candidates assume a patched system always has a newer package version, but CompTIA tests the understanding that backported fixes keep the same version string, requiring manual verification of the changelog or vendor advisory.
How to eliminate wrong answers
Option B is wrong because closing the ticket without verification ignores the scanner's alert and the need for evidence that the backported fix is actually installed. Option C is wrong because raising the severity is inappropriate; the package is not vulnerable, and the scanner's false positive does not warrant escalation. Option D is wrong because disabling the scanner avoids the issue rather than resolving it, and the scanner should be tuned or the finding documented as a false positive.