mediummultiple choiceObjective-mapped

Exhibit

Current firewall policy excerpt:
1. Allow any source -> WEB01 tcp/443
2. Allow any source -> WEB01 tcp/80
3. Allow ADMIN-SUBNET -> WEB01 tcp/22
4. Deny all other inbound traffic

Topology note:
WEB01 currently sits on the same subnet as internal application servers.

Based on the exhibit, which change would best reduce the attack surface of the public web server while preserving remote administration from the internal network?

Question 1mediummultiple choice
Full question →

Based on the exhibit, which change would best reduce the attack surface of the public web server while preserving remote administration from the internal network?

Answer choices

Why each option matters

Good practice is not just finding the correct option. The wrong answers often show the exact trap the exam wants you to fall into.

A

Distractor review

Assign WEB01 a public IP address directly and remove the firewall rules.

This increases exposure because the server is reachable without an additional trust boundary. It does not reduce the attack surface.

B

Best answer

Move WEB01 into a DMZ and allow only the reverse proxy or load balancer to reach it on HTTPS, with admin access limited to the jump host.

A DMZ creates a separate trust boundary for the internet-facing service, limiting blast radius if the web server is compromised. Restricting inbound access to a proxy or load balancer reduces direct exposure, and allowing administration only from a jump host preserves controlled remote management. This is the strongest architectural improvement in the scenario.

C

Distractor review

Place WEB01 on the same VLAN as user workstations so the firewall can inspect traffic more easily.

Putting the server with user devices weakens segmentation and expands lateral-movement opportunities. It does not create a stronger trust boundary.

D

Distractor review

Keep the server where it is and add outbound web filtering to stop exploitation attempts.

Outbound filtering may help limit command-and-control traffic, but it does not address the large inbound exposure shown in the exhibit. The risky service remains directly reachable.

Common exam trap

Common exam trap: authentication is not authorization

Logging in proves the user can authenticate. It does not automatically mean the user is allowed to enter privileged or configuration mode. Watch for AAA authorization, privilege level and command authorization details.

Technical deep dive

How to think about this question

This kind of question is testing the difference between identity and permission. A user may successfully log in to a router because authentication is working, but still fail to enter configuration mode because authorization is missing, misconfigured or mapped to a lower privilege level.

KKey Concepts to Remember

  • Authentication checks who the user is.
  • Authorization controls what the user is allowed to do after login.
  • Privilege levels affect access to EXEC and configuration commands.
  • AAA, TACACS+ and RADIUS can separate login success from command access.

TExam Day Tips

  • Do not assume successful login means full administrative access.
  • Look for words such as cannot enter configuration mode, privilege level, authorization or command access.
  • Separate login problems from permission problems before choosing the answer.

Related practice questions

Related SY0-701 practice-question pages

Use these pages to review the topic behind this question. This is how one missed question becomes focused revision.

More questions from this exam

Keep practising from the same exam bank, or move into a focused topic page if this question exposed a weak area.

FAQ

Questions learners often ask

What does this SY0-701 question test?

Authentication checks who the user is.

What is the correct answer to this question?

The correct answer is: Move WEB01 into a DMZ and allow only the reverse proxy or load balancer to reach it on HTTPS, with admin access limited to the jump host. — The best answer is to move WEB01 into a DMZ and restrict access so only the reverse proxy or load balancer can reach the server on HTTPS, while administration is limited to the jump host. This design separates the public service from internal systems, which is a core defense-in-depth and trust-boundary principle. If the web server is compromised, the attacker has a harder path to internal resources and the management plane remains protected. Why others are wrong: Directly exposing the host with a public IP increases risk. Putting it with user workstations breaks segmentation and enlarges the blast radius. Outbound filtering is useful for containment, but it does not fix the primary issue shown here: overly broad inbound access to a public-facing server.

What should I do if I get this SY0-701 question wrong?

Then try more questions from the same exam bank and focus on understanding why the wrong options are tempting.

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