Good practice is not just finding the correct option. The wrong answers often show the exact trap the exam wants you to fall into.
A
Distractor review
Move the database server into the DMZ so the public proxy can reach it directly.
This would increase risk by exposing the database tier closer to the Internet-facing zone. Databases should be among the most protected assets in a multi-tier design, not placed where they are easier to reach from untrusted networks.
B
Best answer
Keep the reverse proxy in the DMZ and place the application and database servers in private subnets behind it.
This is the best design because it limits Internet exposure to the reverse proxy while keeping the application and database tiers segmented behind internal controls. The proxy can forward only approved traffic to the app tier, and the app tier can talk to the database through tightly defined rules. That preserves function while reducing the attack surface of the more sensitive backend systems.
C
Distractor review
Allow inbound Internet access directly to the application server on 8443, but restrict the database.
Directly exposing the application server creates an unnecessary entry point from the Internet. Even if the database stays restricted, the application server becomes a target for scanning, exploitation, and web attack traffic that the reverse proxy could have absorbed.
D
Distractor review
Collapse all servers into one VLAN and rely on strong passwords for protection.
This removes segmentation entirely and does not address network-level exposure. Strong passwords are important, but they cannot replace isolation between public, application, and database systems in a secure architecture.