mediummultiple choiceObjective-mapped

An internal file server has an administrative web console exposed on the same network as all user laptops. A scan shows that any authenticated employee can reach the console, and several failed login attempts are coming from a workstation that should never manage servers. What is the best hardening action?

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An internal file server has an administrative web console exposed on the same network as all user laptops. A scan shows that any authenticated employee can reach the console, and several failed login attempts are coming from a workstation that should never manage servers. What is the best hardening action?

Answer choices

Why each option matters

Good practice is not just finding the correct option. The wrong answers often show the exact trap the exam wants you to fall into.

A

Best answer

Move the console to a separate management network and restrict access to admin hosts only.

Administrative interfaces should not be reachable from ordinary user endpoints. Moving the console to a dedicated management network and allowing access only from approved admin systems reduces the attack surface and limits who can even attempt to log in. That is a strong hardening control because it addresses both exposure and misuse. If a workstation should never manage servers, network-level segmentation is the right place to enforce that boundary before authentication is even attempted.

B

Distractor review

Increase the number of shared passwords so administrators can log in faster.

Sharing more passwords weakens accountability and makes it harder to trace or limit administrative misuse.

C

Distractor review

Leave the console exposed but shorten the password expiration period.

Password rotation alone does not prevent unauthorized employees from reaching the management interface in the first place.

D

Distractor review

Disable logging so failed attempts do not generate noise.

Disabling logs removes visibility into suspicious access attempts and makes it harder to detect abuse or compromise.

Common exam trap

Common exam trap: NAT rules depend on direction and matching traffic

NAT is not only about the public address. The inside/outside interface roles and the ACL or rule that matches traffic are just as important.

Technical deep dive

How to think about this question

NAT questions usually test address translation, overload/PAT behaviour, static mappings and whether the right traffic is being translated. Read the interface direction and address terms carefully.

KKey Concepts to Remember

  • Static NAT maps one inside address to one outside address.
  • PAT allows many inside hosts to share one public address using ports.
  • Inside local and inside global describe the private and translated addresses.
  • NAT ACLs identify traffic for translation, not always security filtering.

TExam Day Tips

  • Identify inside and outside interfaces first.
  • Check whether the scenario needs static NAT, dynamic NAT or PAT.
  • Do not confuse NAT matching ACLs with normal packet-filtering intent.

Related practice questions

Related SY0-701 practice-question pages

Use these pages to review the topic behind this question. This is how one missed question becomes focused revision.

More questions from this exam

Keep practising from the same exam bank, or move into a focused topic page if this question exposed a weak area.

FAQ

Questions learners often ask

What does this SY0-701 question test?

Static NAT maps one inside address to one outside address.

What is the correct answer to this question?

The correct answer is: Move the console to a separate management network and restrict access to admin hosts only. — The best action is to move the administrative console to a separate management network and restrict access to approved admin hosts only. The problem is not just authentication; it is also exposure. If ordinary employee laptops can reach the management interface, attackers have a larger opportunity to probe or brute-force it. Segmentation and restricted management paths reduce the attack surface before credentials are even tested. This is a textbook hardening measure for infrastructure services that should not be broadly reachable. Why others are wrong: Adding more shared passwords hurts traceability and increases the damage from any leaked credential. Shorter password expiration periods do not fix exposed management access and can create operational friction without meaningful risk reduction. Disabling logging removes the evidence needed to investigate the suspicious attempts and would make the environment less secure, not more. The core issue is improper network exposure of an admin service, so segmentation is the right fix.

What should I do if I get this SY0-701 question wrong?

Then try more questions from the same exam bank and focus on understanding why the wrong options are tempting.

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