hardmulti selectObjective-mapped

A report generator accepts a user-supplied report name and then passes it into a shell command to convert a file. During testing, a malicious value causes the server to run an unexpected system command. Which two changes best mitigate this issue while keeping the feature usable? Select two.

Question 1hardmulti select
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A report generator accepts a user-supplied report name and then passes it into a shell command to convert a file. During testing, a malicious value causes the server to run an unexpected system command. Which two changes best mitigate this issue while keeping the feature usable? Select two.

Answer choices

Why each option matters

Good practice is not just finding the correct option. The wrong answers often show the exact trap the exam wants you to fall into.

A

Best answer

Replace shell command concatenation with a parameterized API or safe library call.

Avoiding direct shell invocation removes the attacker-controlled command injection path. A safe API or library call passes data as data instead of executable syntax. This is the most effective fix because it eliminates the dangerous pattern rather than trying to filter every possible payload.

B

Best answer

Apply strict server-side allowlist validation to the report name before processing.

Allowlisting reduces the input to expected characters or values and blocks metacharacters used in command injection. Validation must happen on the server because client-side checks are easy to bypass. Used with safer command handling, it significantly lowers the risk of abuse.

C

Distractor review

HTML-encode the report name before inserting it into the shell command.

HTML encoding protects web pages from script injection, not operating-system shell interpretation. It does not stop the shell from treating characters like semicolons or pipes as command separators. The control does not address the execution context shown in the scenario.

D

Distractor review

Switch the feature from POST to GET so the values are easier to inspect.

Changing HTTP method does not fix command injection. The vulnerability is in how the server uses the input, not in the request verb. GET may even make sensitive values more visible in logs and history without improving security.

E

Distractor review

Hide the server error messages so attackers cannot see the failure details.

Suppressing error output can reduce information leakage, but it does not stop command execution. The application would still process attacker-controlled shell content if the input is unsafe. This is a helpful hardening measure, not a root-cause fix.

Common exam trap

Common exam trap: NAT rules depend on direction and matching traffic

NAT is not only about the public address. The inside/outside interface roles and the ACL or rule that matches traffic are just as important.

Technical deep dive

How to think about this question

NAT questions usually test address translation, overload/PAT behaviour, static mappings and whether the right traffic is being translated. Read the interface direction and address terms carefully.

KKey Concepts to Remember

  • Static NAT maps one inside address to one outside address.
  • PAT allows many inside hosts to share one public address using ports.
  • Inside local and inside global describe the private and translated addresses.
  • NAT ACLs identify traffic for translation, not always security filtering.

TExam Day Tips

  • Identify inside and outside interfaces first.
  • Check whether the scenario needs static NAT, dynamic NAT or PAT.
  • Do not confuse NAT matching ACLs with normal packet-filtering intent.

Related practice questions

Related SY0-701 practice-question pages

Use these pages to review the topic behind this question. This is how one missed question becomes focused revision.

More questions from this exam

Keep practising from the same exam bank, or move into a focused topic page if this question exposed a weak area.

FAQ

Questions learners often ask

What does this SY0-701 question test?

Static NAT maps one inside address to one outside address.

What is the correct answer to this question?

The correct answer is: Replace shell command concatenation with a parameterized API or safe library call. — The best mitigations are to stop concatenating shell commands and to enforce strict server-side allowlist validation. A parameterized API or safe library call removes the execution boundary that the attacker is exploiting. Validation then ensures only expected values are accepted. Together, those controls address both the dangerous implementation and the untrusted input that makes command injection possible. Why others are wrong: HTML encoding, changing HTTP methods, and hiding errors do not remove the shell-injection flaw. They may help with other classes of problems or reduce information disclosure, but they do not prevent the server from executing attacker-controlled command syntax. The correct fix must change how the command is built and restrict what input is accepted.

What should I do if I get this SY0-701 question wrong?

Then try more questions from the same exam bank and focus on understanding why the wrong options are tempting.

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