hardmulti selectObjective-mapped

Exhibit

Endpoint findings:
- Local root certificate store was modified
- Browser trusts a new enterprise-looking root CA
- TLS warnings no longer appear for the internal portal
- The user has local administrator rights

A developer installed an unknown root CA on a laptop. The browser now accepts a proxy certificate for intranet.apps.example without warnings. Which two controls most directly reduce the chance that this endpoint trusts a malicious interception certificate? Select two.

Question 1hardmulti select
Full question →

A developer installed an unknown root CA on a laptop. The browser now accepts a proxy certificate for intranet.apps.example without warnings. Which two controls most directly reduce the chance that this endpoint trusts a malicious interception certificate? Select two.

Answer choices

Why each option matters

Good practice is not just finding the correct option. The wrong answers often show the exact trap the exam wants you to fall into.

A

Best answer

Enforce certificate pinning in the application for the expected server certificate.

Certificate pinning reduces the chance that a malicious trusted root on the endpoint can impersonate the server. The app checks for a known certificate or public key, not just any certificate signed by a trusted CA.

B

Distractor review

Allow employees to add any root CA as long as the certificate is password-protected.

Password protection does not make an untrusted root safe. If the endpoint trusts a malicious CA, the browser can still accept forged certificates, which defeats the purpose of certificate validation.

C

Best answer

Prevent local administrators from modifying the trusted root store through endpoint policy.

Locking down the trusted root store limits the attacker’s ability to add a rogue CA. If users cannot alter trust anchors freely, it becomes much harder to silently intercept TLS traffic on that device.

D

Distractor review

Rely on HTTPS alone because any certificate over TLS is safe.

HTTPS only helps when certificate validation is trustworthy. If the endpoint trusts a malicious root, HTTPS can be used by the attacker just as easily as by the legitimate server.

E

Distractor review

Disable DNS because certificate trust does not depend on hostnames.

Certificate validation does depend on hostnames and trust chains. Disabling DNS does not solve local trust-store tampering, and it would likely break normal application connectivity.

Common exam trap

Common exam trap: answer the scenario, not the keyword

Many certification questions include familiar terms but test a specific constraint. Read the exact wording before choosing an answer that is generally true but wrong for this case.

Technical deep dive

How to think about this question

This question should be treated as a scenario, not a definition check. Identify the problem, the constraint and the best action. Then compare each option against those facts.

KKey Concepts to Remember

  • Read the scenario before looking for a memorised answer.
  • Find the constraint that changes the correct option.
  • Eliminate answers that are true in general but not in this case.
  • Use explanations to understand the rule behind the answer.

TExam Day Tips

  • Underline the problem statement mentally.
  • Watch for words such as best, first, most likely and least administrative effort.
  • Review why wrong options are wrong, not only why the correct option is correct.

Related practice questions

Related SY0-701 practice-question pages

Use these pages to review the topic behind this question. This is how one missed question becomes focused revision.

More questions from this exam

Keep practising from the same exam bank, or move into a focused topic page if this question exposed a weak area.

FAQ

Questions learners often ask

What does this SY0-701 question test?

Read the scenario before looking for a memorised answer.

What is the correct answer to this question?

The correct answer is: Enforce certificate pinning in the application for the expected server certificate. — The best protections are to pin the expected certificate or public key in the application and to stop unauthorized changes to the endpoint trust store. Pinning protects the app even if the local machine has a rogue root certificate. Restricting trust-store changes prevents the user or attacker from silently adding a CA that can mint convincing fake certificates for interception. Why others are wrong: Password protection on a certificate does not make it trustworthy, and HTTPS is only secure when validation is intact. DNS changes do not address the compromised root store. The real problem is that the endpoint now trusts a malicious certificate authority, so controls must target trust anchors and certificate verification.

What should I do if I get this SY0-701 question wrong?

Then try more questions from the same exam bank and focus on understanding why the wrong options are tempting.

Discussion

Loading comments…

Sign in to join the discussion.