You are troubleshooting a scenario where users are unable to access a specific internal cloud resource after migrating to Cisco Secure Access. The traffic is being blocked by a default policy. How should you modify the traffic flow to ensure internal traffic stays off the SIG?
Trap 1: Disable the 'Inspect Traffic' setting globally in the Secure Access…
Disabling inspection globally removes the SIG from all traffic paths, including internet-bound flows that still require policy enforcement, rather than steering only internal destinations around it. It appeals as a quick fix, and would be right if the entire estate were trusted internal traffic needing no inspection.
Trap 2: Update the DNS policy to include internal domain suffixes as…
DNS exceptions only alter name resolution; the client still routes the internal resource's packets through the SIG tunnel, where the default policy drops them. It is tempting because DNS is the first visible failure point, and would be correct if resolution, not traffic steering, were the actual fault.
Trap 3: Assign the users to a separate Group Policy that has no web…
Internal traffic bypasses the SIG through the Internal Domains or bypass configuration, which steers matching destinations directly to the internet or internal network. Removing web filtering from a Group Policy still routes traffic through the SIG. It is tempting because policy changes appear to control traffic flow, but filtering is not the bypass mechanism.
- A
Configure a Tunnel Exclusion in the Secure Access tunnel settings for the internal IP ranges.
A Tunnel Exclusion removes the specified internal IP ranges from the tunnel's interesting traffic, so that traffic routes natively via the local network instead of being sent to the SIG and blocked by default policy.
- B
Disable the 'Inspect Traffic' setting globally in the Secure Access dashboard.
Why it fails: Disabling inspection globally removes the SIG from all traffic paths, including internet-bound flows that still require policy enforcement, rather than steering only internal destinations around it. It appeals as a quick fix, and would be right if the entire estate were trusted internal traffic needing no inspection.
- C
Update the DNS policy to include internal domain suffixes as exceptions.
Why it fails: DNS exceptions only alter name resolution; the client still routes the internal resource's packets through the SIG tunnel, where the default policy drops them. It is tempting because DNS is the first visible failure point, and would be correct if resolution, not traffic steering, were the actual fault.
- D
Assign the users to a separate Group Policy that has no web filtering enabled.
Why it fails: Internal traffic bypasses the SIG through the Internal Domains or bypass configuration, which steers matching destinations directly to the internet or internal network. Removing web filtering from a Group Policy still routes traffic through the SIG. It is tempting because policy changes appear to control traffic flow, but filtering is not the bypass mechanism.