A financial services firm must prove to regulators that its nightly ETL job loaded the same source data that was archived for a given business date, and that no record was altered after extraction. Which combination of practices best provides this non-repudiation evidence?
A cryptographic hash acts as a content fingerprint: if even one byte changes, the hash differs. Recording the hash alongside the archived extract and re-verifying before and after load proves the loaded data is byte-identical to what was archived, providing the non-repudiation evidence regulators require. This is the standard integrity control for ETL provenance.
Why this answer
Non-repudiation of an ETL load requires content-level integrity evidence, not just operational success signals or access controls. Hashing the extract, storing the digest with the archive, and re-verifying before and after load creates a verifiable chain proving the loaded data matches the archived source and was not altered. Exit codes, TLS, and certificate authentication cannot demonstrate content equality.
Exam trap
The trap here is treating a successful job run, strong authentication, or transport encryption as proof that the loaded data matches the archived source, when only a content hash can demonstrate that equivalence.