Question 1hardmultiple choice
Full question →hardmultiple choiceObjective-mapped
Exhibit
Current trust policy in Account A:
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::444455556666:root"},
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
}
]
}
CloudTrail entry from Account A:
{
"eventSource": "sts.amazonaws.com",
"eventName": "AssumeRole",
"userIdentity": {
"type": "AssumedRole",
"arn": "arn:aws:sts::444455556666:assumed-role/OtherRole/automation"
},
"errorCode": "AccessDenied"
}Based on the exhibit, a workload in Account B must assume a role in Account A. Security requires that only the specific role arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/PipelineExecRole can assume it, and only when the caller supplies the external ID acct-b-prod-7788. Which change best satisfies the requirement with the least privilege?
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Good practice is not just finding the correct option. The wrong answers often show the exact trap the exam wants you to fall into.
A
Distractor review
Keep the root principal and add an aws:PrincipalTag condition in the trust policy to require the tag acct-b-prod-7788.
Principal tags can help with authorization, but they do not ensure that only one exact role in Account B can call STS. Any principal that can supply the tag might still satisfy the condition. This does not provide the required caller-specific trust boundary.
B
Best answer
Replace the principal with arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/PipelineExecRole and add a StringEquals condition on sts:ExternalId = acct-b-prod-7788.
This change directly restricts trust to one named role in Account B and adds a confused-deputy defense with the external ID. The role trust policy is the correct place to control who can assume the role, and the external ID ensures only the expected caller can complete the STS request.
C
Distractor review
Attach a permission boundary to the role in Account A so that only PipelineExecRole can use it.
Permission boundaries limit the maximum permissions a role can have after it is assumed, but they do not control who is trusted to assume the role. The trust policy, not the permission boundary, determines which external principal can call sts:AssumeRole.
D
Distractor review
Add an SCP in Account B that allows sts:AssumeRole only for PipelineExecRole.
An SCP can constrain identities in Account B, but it cannot by itself grant trust on the role in Account A. The trust policy in Account A must still explicitly allow the correct principal and should include the external ID condition for secure cross-account access.
Common exam trap
Common exam trap: authentication is not authorization
Logging in proves the user can authenticate. It does not automatically mean the user is allowed to enter privileged or configuration mode. Watch for AAA authorization, privilege level and command authorization details.
Technical deep dive
How to think about this question
This kind of question is testing the difference between identity and permission. A user may successfully log in to a router because authentication is working, but still fail to enter configuration mode because authorization is missing, misconfigured or mapped to a lower privilege level.
KKey Concepts to Remember
- Authentication checks who the user is.
- Authorization controls what the user is allowed to do after login.
- Privilege levels affect access to EXEC and configuration commands.
- AAA, TACACS+ and RADIUS can separate login success from command access.
TExam Day Tips
- Do not assume successful login means full administrative access.
- Look for words such as cannot enter configuration mode, privilege level, authorization or command access.
- Separate login problems from permission problems before choosing the answer.
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More questions from this exam
Keep practising from the same exam bank, or move into a focused topic page if this question exposed a weak area.
Question 1
A team needs to distribute TCP traffic (not HTTP) across multiple services. The services must see the original client source IP for auditing. Which AWS load balancer is the best fit?
Question 2
A team wants to run containerized services with AWS-managed orchestration and autoscaling. They do NOT require Kubernetes compatibility. Which AWS service choice is most appropriate to meet these goals?
Question 3
A solutions architect is designing an S3 bucket for a IoT ingestion API. The objects must never be publicly accessible, even if a developer later adds an overly broad bucket policy. What should the architect configure? The design must avoid adding custom operational scripts.
Question 4
A solutions architect is designing an S3 bucket for a claims portal. The objects must never be publicly accessible, even if a developer later adds an overly broad bucket policy. What should the architect configure?
Question 5
A team wants to delegate IAM management to developers, but must ensure developers can never grant themselves permissions beyond a specific limit. Which AWS mechanism best matches this requirement?
Question 6
A solutions architect is designing an S3 bucket for a healthcare document service. The objects must never be publicly accessible, even if a developer later adds an overly broad bucket policy. What should the architect configure?
FAQ
Questions learners often ask
What does this SAA-C03 question test?
Authentication checks who the user is.
What is the correct answer to this question?
The correct answer is: Replace the principal with arn:aws:iam::444455556666:role/PipelineExecRole and add a StringEquals condition on sts:ExternalId = acct-b-prod-7788. — The best fix is to trust only the exact IAM role in Account B and require the external ID in the role trust policy. That addresses both the principal scope and the confused-deputy risk. A trust policy is the authoritative control for sts:AssumeRole access. Using the account root as principal is too broad because it allows any principal in that account that meets conditions to attempt assumption. Principal tags are not a substitute for narrowing the trusted AWS principal. Permission boundaries do not control who can assume the role. An SCP in Account B can limit local actions, but it does not replace the trust policy in Account A. The correct solution must be implemented in the trusting role's policy.
What should I do if I get this SAA-C03 question wrong?
Then try more questions from the same exam bank and focus on understanding why the wrong options are tempting.
Discussion
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