mediummultiple choiceObjective-mapped

A retail company lets developers deploy ECS services but they must never be able to modify IAM. The team currently uses an IAM user per developer with an admin-like policy, and several access keys have been leaked. You are asked to redesign access so that: (1) developers authenticate with temporary credentials, (2) they can create/update ECS services and related autoscaling resources, and (3) IAM changes are impossible even if a developer tries to attach new policies.

Which design best meets all requirements?

Question 1mediummultiple choice
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A retail company lets developers deploy ECS services but they must never be able to modify IAM. The team currently uses an IAM user per developer with an admin-like policy, and several access keys have been leaked. You are asked to redesign access so that: (1) developers authenticate with temporary credentials, (2) they can create/update ECS services and related autoscaling resources, and (3) IAM changes are impossible even if a developer tries to attach new policies.

Which design best meets all requirements?

Answer choices

Why each option matters

Good practice is not just finding the correct option. The wrong answers often show the exact trap the exam wants you to fall into.

A

Distractor review

Create an IAM user for each developer and keep the existing broad permissions, rotating keys every 90 days.

Long-lived IAM user access contradicts temporary credentials requirements. Rotating keys reduces exposure but does not prevent repeated leakage or enforce least privilege at scale.

B

Best answer

Use an IAM role that developers assume for deployments; attach least-privilege policies for ECS and Auto Scaling; and attach a permission boundary that does not allow iam:* actions, so additional inline or managed policies cannot grant IAM permissions.

Assuming a role provides temporary credentials and removes long-lived keys. Least-privilege policies limit allowed actions, and a permission boundary caps the role's effective permissions so IAM actions cannot be gained through later policy changes.

C

Distractor review

Attach a policy that allows ecs:* and autoscaling:* and rely on developers to self-review that no IAM statements are added to their roles.

Self-review is not an enforceable control. Without a permission boundary or explicit deny, developers could add iam:* permissions and violate the security requirement.

D

Distractor review

Create a single shared IAM role with full administrator permissions so developers can troubleshoot faster when deployments fail.

Administrator permissions violate least-privilege and allow IAM changes. A shared role also makes accountability weaker and increases blast radius of mistakes.

Common exam trap

Common exam trap: authentication is not authorization

Logging in proves the user can authenticate. It does not automatically mean the user is allowed to enter privileged or configuration mode. Watch for AAA authorization, privilege level and command authorization details.

Technical deep dive

How to think about this question

This kind of question is testing the difference between identity and permission. A user may successfully log in to a router because authentication is working, but still fail to enter configuration mode because authorization is missing, misconfigured or mapped to a lower privilege level.

KKey Concepts to Remember

  • Authentication checks who the user is.
  • Authorization controls what the user is allowed to do after login.
  • Privilege levels affect access to EXEC and configuration commands.
  • AAA, TACACS+ and RADIUS can separate login success from command access.

TExam Day Tips

  • Do not assume successful login means full administrative access.
  • Look for words such as cannot enter configuration mode, privilege level, authorization or command access.
  • Separate login problems from permission problems before choosing the answer.

Related practice questions

Related SAA-C03 practice-question pages

Use these pages to review the topic behind this question. This is how one missed question becomes focused revision.

More questions from this exam

Keep practising from the same exam bank, or move into a focused topic page if this question exposed a weak area.

FAQ

Questions learners often ask

What does this SAA-C03 question test?

Authentication checks who the user is.

What is the correct answer to this question?

The correct answer is: Use an IAM role that developers assume for deployments; attach least-privilege policies for ECS and Auto Scaling; and attach a permission boundary that does not allow iam:* actions, so additional inline or managed policies cannot grant IAM permissions. — Assuming an IAM role with temporary credentials eliminates the risk and operational burden of leaked access keys. You can grant only the specific ECS and Auto Scaling actions needed for deployment via least-privilege policies, then attach a permission boundary that excludes IAM permissions. This keeps the deployment role from ever gaining iam:* privileges through future policy attachments, while still allowing the required application deployment actions. Why others are wrong: Option A keeps long-lived IAM users, which conflicts with temporary credential requirements and does not eliminate leaked key risk. Option C relies on developers to avoid adding IAM permissions; without enforceable boundaries, escalation is possible. Option D grants administrator access, which violates least privilege and directly allows IAM changes. Only option B uses both role-based temporary access and a boundary to prevent IAM modifications.

What should I do if I get this SAA-C03 question wrong?

Then try more questions from the same exam bank and focus on understanding why the wrong options are tempting.

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