While reviewing a compromised host in the Cortex XDR Incident Viewer, an analyst wants to isolate the endpoint from the network to prevent lateral movement while maintaining administrative access. Which response action should the analyst initiate?
Trap 1: Disable User
Disable User suspends the account's authentication, which does not sever the compromised host's existing network sessions, so lateral movement continues. It suits revoking a compromised identity's access, not containing an endpoint that must stay reachable for administrative remediation.
Trap 2: Kill Process Tree
Kill Process Tree terminates the malicious process and its children but leaves the endpoint's network interfaces active, so lateral movement is not prevented. It suits stopping active malicious execution, not isolating a host from the network while retaining administrative access.
Trap 3: Quarantine File
Quarantine File isolates a malicious file artefact on the endpoint, not the host's network connectivity, so lateral movement remains possible. It suits containing a known malicious binary pending analysis, not severing an infected host's network access while preserving administrative reach.
- A
Disable User
Why it fails: Disable User suspends the account's authentication, which does not sever the compromised host's existing network sessions, so lateral movement continues. It suits revoking a compromised identity's access, not containing an endpoint that must stay reachable for administrative remediation.
- B
Isolate Endpoint
Isolate Endpoint enforces a host-based network containment policy, blocking all traffic except the Cortex XDR management channel, so the analyst retains administrative control while lateral movement is prevented. This directly satisfies the stem's dual requirement: network isolation with preserved administrative access for investigation.
- C
Kill Process Tree
Why it fails: Kill Process Tree terminates the malicious process and its children but leaves the endpoint's network interfaces active, so lateral movement is not prevented. It suits stopping active malicious execution, not isolating a host from the network while retaining administrative access.
- D
Quarantine File
Why it fails: Quarantine File isolates a malicious file artefact on the endpoint, not the host's network connectivity, so lateral movement remains possible. It suits containing a known malicious binary pending analysis, not severing an infected host's network access while preserving administrative reach.