A multinational corporation requires low-latency access for users in Frankfurt and London, with strict data isolation ensuring European data does not leave designated jurisdictions. Which OCI architectural construct should you use to organize their resources?
Trap 1: Compartments
Compartments are logical IAM and policy containers for organising and isolating resources; they carry no physical location, so data residency and latency cannot be enforced through them. They would be correct for separating billing, access control and quotas between teams or projects.
Trap 2: Availability Domains
Availability domains are isolated datacentre groupings within one region, providing fault separation rather than geographic placement or jurisdictional data boundaries. They would be correct for spreading resources against datacentre failure inside a single region, not for keeping Frankfurt and London data within separate countries.
Trap 3: Fault Domains
Fault domains are independent hardware groupings inside a single availability domain, protecting against rack or power failure. They would be the right construct for anti-affinity placement of instances within one datacentre, not for meeting cross-country latency and data-residency requirements.
- A
OCI Regions
Regions are physically isolated geographic areas, so placing resources in Frankfurt and London keeps European data within those jurisdictions while serving users locally at low latency. Availability domains and fault domains sit inside a region and cannot satisfy the cross-jurisdiction isolation or proximity constraint.
- B
Compartments
Why it fails: Compartments are logical IAM and policy containers for organising and isolating resources; they carry no physical location, so data residency and latency cannot be enforced through them. They would be correct for separating billing, access control and quotas between teams or projects.
- C
Availability Domains
Why it fails: Availability domains are isolated datacentre groupings within one region, providing fault separation rather than geographic placement or jurisdictional data boundaries. They would be correct for spreading resources against datacentre failure inside a single region, not for keeping Frankfurt and London data within separate countries.
- D
Fault Domains
Why it fails: Fault domains are independent hardware groupings inside a single availability domain, protecting against rack or power failure. They would be the right construct for anti-affinity placement of instances within one datacentre, not for meeting cross-country latency and data-residency requirements.