easyMultiple Choice
SSCP Practice Question: Refer to the exhibit
Exhibit
Refer to the exhibit. OpenSSL> s_client -connect example.com:443 ... New, TLSv1.2, Cipher is ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Server public key is 2048 bit ...
Refer to the exhibit. Which component of the cipher suite provides perfect forward secrecy?
⚠ Common exam trap
ISC2 often tests the distinction between the protocol version (TLS 1.2) and the cipher suite components that actually implement PFS, leading candidates to incorrectly select TLS 1.2 because they associate it with modern security features.
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.
Correct answer & explanation
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ECDHE
ECDHE (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral) provides perfect forward secrecy (PFS) because it generates a unique, ephemeral session key for each TLS session. If the long-term private key is compromised, past session keys cannot be derived, as the ephemeral keys are discarded after use. This is defined in RFC 4492 and is a core property of ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Answer analysis
Option-by-option breakdown
For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.
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ECDHE
Why this is correct
ECDHE is an ephemeral elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Because a fresh key pair is generated per session and discarded afterwards, compromise of the server's long-term private key cannot decrypt previously captured sessions, which is precisely perfect forward secrecy.
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TLS 1.2
Why it's wrong here
TLS 1.2 is the protocol version, not a cipher-suite component, and it merely permits ephemeral key exchange without guaranteeing it. It is tempting because forward secrecy requires TLS 1.2 or later, yet the actual mechanism is the ECDHE key-exchange algorithm within the suite.
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AES256-GCM
Why it's wrong here
AES256-GCM is the bulk symmetric cipher providing confidentiality and integrity of record data, using a session key; it performs no key exchange, so it cannot deliver forward secrecy. It is tempting as the suite's most visible algorithm, but ephemeral ECDHE key agreement is what protects past sessions.
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SHA384
Why it's wrong here
SHA384 is the suite's hash for message authentication and integrity, not a key-exchange mechanism, so it cannot provide forward secrecy. It is tempting because it appears in the cipher suite name, but forward secrecy comes from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange such as ECDHE.
Quick reference
Asymmetric Encryption Algorithm Comparison
| Algorithm | Key Exchange | Signatures | Equivalent Security Key | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSA-3072 | Yes | Yes | 128-bit | Widely deployed; slow for bulk data |
| ECDSA P-256 | No | Yes | 128-bit | Fast signatures; standard TLS certs |
| ECDH / ECDHE | Yes | No | 128-bit | Perfect forward secrecy in TLS 1.3 |
| DH / DHE | Yes | No | 128-bit (3072-bit key) | Replaced by ECDHE in modern TLS |
| Ed25519 | No | Yes | ~128-bit | SSH keys, modern PKI |
About these practice questions
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JA
Written by Johnson Ajibi, MSc IT Security
Senior Network & Security Engineer · founder of Courseiva
This SSCP practice question is part of Courseiva's free ISC2 certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the SSCP exam.