A company is implementing VPC Service Controls to protect sensitive data in Google Cloud Storage. They want to allow a private on-premises subnet (10.1.0.0/16) to access the storage buckets via a Cloud VPN tunnel, but deny all other on-premises traffic. Which configuration approach meets this requirement with least privilege?
Correct: bridged access level ensures traffic goes through VPN and originates from correct subnet.
Why this answer
VPC Service Controls use access levels to define which client identities or network sources can access protected services. By creating a bridged access level that includes both the private IP range 10.1.0.0/16 and a VPC network condition (the VPC connected via Cloud VPN), you ensure that only traffic originating from that specific on-premises subnet and arriving through the authorized VPC is allowed, denying all other on-premises traffic by default. This follows the least-privilege principle by not allowing broader IP ranges or relying on implicit denies.
Exam trap
Google Cloud often tests the misconception that an IP-based access level alone is sufficient for VPN-connected traffic, but the trap here is that without a VPC network condition, the access level would allow any traffic with that IP range, including from other networks or spoofed sources, failing the least-privilege and VPN-specific requirement.
How to eliminate wrong answers
Option A is wrong because creating a service perimeter that allows all on-premises traffic and then adding an explicit deny for other IP ranges violates least privilege by initially granting overly broad access, and VPC Service Controls do not support explicit deny rules within a perimeter—they rely on default deny for sources not in the access level. Option C is wrong because Cloud NAT is a Google Cloud service used for outbound traffic from private GCP instances to the internet, not for on-premises networks; configuring NAT in the on-premises network would require a public IP, which defeats the purpose of using a private IP range and does not integrate with VPC Service Controls access levels. Option D is wrong because an access level with only the IP range 10.1.0.0/16 does not include a VPC network condition, so it would allow traffic from any network claiming that IP range (including spoofed or overlapping ranges), not just traffic arriving via the specific Cloud VPN tunnel, thus violating the requirement to restrict access to the VPN-connected subnet only.