An operator has compromised an account with GenericAll permissions over a computer object in Active Directory. How can this permission be leveraged to achieve code execution on the target host?
Writing msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on the target computer object grants a controlled account resource-based constrained delegation, letting it impersonate any user to that host's service. Combined with GenericAll's write access, the operator obtains a service ticket as a privileged user, then executes code via SMB or WinRM on the target.
Why this answer
GenericAll on a computer object allows full control, including the ability to write to the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute. By setting this attribute to a controlled account, an attacker can configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD), enabling that account to impersonate any user to the target computer and achieve code execution via Kerberos delegation. This is a well-known privilege escalation path in Active Directory.
Exam trap
The trap here is confusing GenericAll on a computer with permissions needed for DCSync or direct SAM modification; candidates may overlook RBCD as a viable escalation path.
How to eliminate wrong answers
Option A is wrong because modifying PrimaryGroupID to Domain Admins is not possible with GenericAll on a computer object; PrimaryGroupID is an attribute of user objects, and even if it were, it would not directly grant code execution on the host. Option B is wrong because DCSync requires Replicating Directory Changes permissions, not GenericAll on a computer, and it targets domain controllers, not computer registry hives. Option C is wrong because directly modifying the local SAM database over RPC without credentials is not feasible; it requires administrative access to the target, which is what the attacker is trying to achieve.