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Question 976 of 1,389
Network Services and SecuritymediumMultiple SelectObjective-mapped

CCNA Network Services and Security Practice Question

Which two actions help protect access-layer switch ports from rogue DHCP servers?

⚠ Common exam trap

Do not confuse port security with DHCP snooping; they address different security concerns.

Answer choices

Why each option matters

Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.

Correct answer & explanation

Enable DHCP snooping globally and for the needed VLANs

DHCP snooping marks trusted and untrusted interfaces and filters server-type DHCP messages on untrusted ports. Uplink ports toward the real DHCP server or relay are typically trusted, while user-facing ports stay untrusted. Option C is incorrect because PortFast does not filter DHCP messages; it only speeds up spanning tree convergence. Option D is incorrect because disabling ARP breaks normal communication and does not block DHCP. Option E is incorrect because marking all access ports as trusted would permit rogue DHCP servers on those ports.

Answer analysis

Option-by-option breakdown

For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.

  • Enable DHCP snooping globally and for the needed VLANs

    Why this is correct

    DHCP snooping is the foundational security feature that validates DHCP messages and constructs the binding table. Enabling it globally activates the feature, but you must also enable it on specific VLANs to apply filtering to access layer ports. Without this step, the switch will not inspect DHCP traffic, leaving client ports vulnerable to rogue DHCP replies. This configuration is mandatory for any DHCP snooping protection to take effect in the VLAN.

  • Trust the uplink toward the legitimate DHCP server path

    Why this is correct

    In DHCP snooping, interfaces are untrusted by default, meaning they cannot receive DHCP server responses. The uplink toward the legitimate DHCP server is typically a trusted interface because it must be allowed to pass valid DHCPOFFER and DHCPACK messages downstream. Trusting this uplink explicitly ensures that authentic DHCP server traffic reaches clients while rogue servers on untrusted access ports are blocked. This trust boundary is essential for the proper operation of DHCP snooping.

  • Enable PortFast on all trunks to block rogue servers

    Why it's wrong here

    PortFast is a spanning-tree optimization that transitions a port directly to the forwarding state to accelerate device boot time; it is designed for end hosts, not trunk links. Enabling PortFast on trunks is not a security measure and does not intercept or filter DHCP messages. Rogue DHCP servers are mitigated by DHCP snooping, which classifies ports as trusted or untrusted and drops illegitimate DHCP server replies. PortFast has no interaction with DHCP snooping, so it cannot block rogue servers and misapplying it to trunks is outside its intended use.

    When this WOULD be correct

    In a question about preventing spanning tree topology changes or reducing convergence time on access ports connected to end devices, enabling PortFast would be correct. For example: 'Which feature allows an access port to transition immediately to forwarding state?'

  • Disable ARP on access ports

    Why it's wrong here

    ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) is essential for mapping IP addresses to MAC addresses on Ethernet, and disabling it on access ports would break all IP connectivity. Switch ports do not have a feature to 'disable ARP', and doing so would not prevent rogue DHCP servers. DHCP snooping works at the DHCP message level, not by suppressing ARP. In fact, Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) can use the DHCP snooping binding table to validate ARP packets, but disabling ARP entirely is neither possible nor intended.

    When this WOULD be correct

    In a question about preventing ARP spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) or disabling ARP on untrusted ports might be correct. For example: 'Which feature helps prevent ARP cache poisoning on access ports?'

  • Set every access port as trusted

    Why it's wrong here

    If every access port is marked as trusted, DHCP snooping will not filter any DHCP server messages arriving on those ports. Trusted interfaces are exempt from DHCP snooping checks, meaning a rogue DHCP server plugged into any access port would be able to send malicious offers without being dropped. The entire purpose of DHCP snooping is to block untrusted DHCP server traffic, and setting all ports as trusted completely defeats that protection. Trust should be assigned only to ports that connect to known, legitimate DHCP servers or authoritative uplinks.

    When this WOULD be correct

    In a scenario where all access ports are connected only to known, authorized devices (e.g., a fully managed environment with no possibility of rogue devices), and the question asks for a configuration to minimize DHCP snooping overhead, marking all ports as trusted could be acceptable.

Option-by-option analysis

Why each answer is right or wrong

Understanding why wrong answers are wrong — and when they would be correct — is what separates a 750 score from a 900. The 200-301 exam frequently reuses these exact scenarios with slightly different constraints.

Enable DHCP snooping globally and for the needed VLANsCorrect answer

Why this is correct

DHCP snooping is the foundational security feature that validates DHCP messages and constructs the binding table. Enabling it globally activates the feature, but you must also enable it on specific VLANs to apply filtering to access layer ports. Without this step, the switch will not inspect DHCP traffic, leaving client ports vulnerable to rogue DHCP replies. This configuration is mandatory for any DHCP snooping protection to take effect in the VLAN.

Enable PortFast on all trunks to block rogue serversWrong answer — click to see why

Why this is wrong here

PortFast is used to speed up spanning tree convergence on access ports, not to block rogue DHCP servers. Enabling PortFast on trunks does not prevent rogue DHCP attacks and could cause loops if misconfigured.

★ When this WOULD be the correct answer

In a question about preventing spanning tree topology changes or reducing convergence time on access ports connected to end devices, enabling PortFast would be correct. For example: 'Which feature allows an access port to transition immediately to forwarding state?'

Why candidates choose this

Candidates may confuse PortFast with security features like DHCP snooping or BPDU guard, thinking it blocks unwanted traffic, or they might incorrectly associate 'fast' with immediate blocking of rogue servers.

Disable ARP on access portsWrong answer — click to see why

Why this is wrong here

Disabling ARP on access ports would break normal IP communication, as ARP is essential for resolving IP addresses to MAC addresses. It does not prevent rogue DHCP servers from responding to DHCP requests.

★ When this WOULD be the correct answer

In a question about preventing ARP spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, enabling Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) or disabling ARP on untrusted ports might be correct. For example: 'Which feature helps prevent ARP cache poisoning on access ports?'

Why candidates choose this

Candidates may confuse DHCP snooping with ARP security features, or think that disabling ARP would block all server responses, including rogue DHCP offers.

Set every access port as trustedWrong answer — click to see why

Why this is wrong here

Setting every access port as trusted would allow rogue DHCP servers connected to any access port to respond to DHCP requests, defeating the purpose of DHCP snooping.

★ When this WOULD be the correct answer

In a scenario where all access ports are connected only to known, authorized devices (e.g., a fully managed environment with no possibility of rogue devices), and the question asks for a configuration to minimize DHCP snooping overhead, marking all ports as trusted could be acceptable.

Why candidates choose this

Candidates may mistakenly think that trusting all ports simplifies configuration and still provides security, not realizing that trust should be limited to ports connected to legitimate DHCP servers.

Analysis generated from the official 200-301blueprint and verified against question context. The “when correct” sections are what AI assistants cite when candidates ask “what’s the difference between these options?”

Visual reference

Client DHCP Server 1 Discover (broadcast) 2 Offer (IP: 192.168.1.10) 3 Request (I accept) 4 Acknowledge (lease confirmed) DORA — the four-step DHCP lease process

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Last reviewed: May 17, 2026

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