After a hub was connected to interface Gi0/10, the interface immediately entered errdisable state. The following syslog message was generated: '%PORT_SECURITY-2-PSECURE_VIOLATION: Security violation occurred on interface Gi0/10.' What is the strongest explanation for why Gi0/10 shut down?
Exhibit
interface GigabitEthernet0/10 switchport mode access switchport port-security switchport port-security maximum 1 switchport port-security violation shutdown Event: %PORT_SECURITY-2-PSECURE_VIOLATION: Security violation occurred, caused by MAC addresses ... on port Gi0/10.
Trap 1: The interface received a superior BPDU and became the root port.
STP role changes like becoming a root port occur when a superior BPDU is received, but that event would be reflected in spanning-tree state transitions and forwarding behavior, not in a security intrusion log. A hub does not originate BPDUs, and the error message clearly identifies a port-security violation rather than an STP topology change. Therefore, the interface's down state is due to security enforcement, not a spanning-tree decision.
Trap 2: The hub forced the interface to become a routed port.
A hub is a Layer 1 device that simply forwards electrical signals, so it cannot change the logical mode of a switch interface. A routed port is created only by explicitly removing Layer 2 switching with the "no switchport" command, which is not shown here. The log message references a port-security violation, not a change in interface mode.
Trap 3: DHCP snooping always shuts a port when a hub is attached.
DHCP snooping filters DHCP messages based on whether a port is trusted or untrusted; it does not count MAC addresses or react to the simple attachment of a hub. A hub only extends the collision domain, and it does not generate DHCP traffic or cause a DHCP snooping violation by itself. The exhibit shows a port-security restriction on secure MAC addresses, not any DHCP-related action.
- A
Port security detected more MAC addresses than allowed on the interface.
Port security is explicitly configured to allow only one secure MAC address, and the violation message indicates that additional MAC addresses were seen on the interface. When a hub connects, multiple end devices share that single physical port, causing the switch to detect more source MACs than the configured maximum. This triggers the port-security violation and puts the interface into an error-disabled state, matching the exhibit.
- B
The interface received a superior BPDU and became the root port.
Why wrong: STP role changes like becoming a root port occur when a superior BPDU is received, but that event would be reflected in spanning-tree state transitions and forwarding behavior, not in a security intrusion log. A hub does not originate BPDUs, and the error message clearly identifies a port-security violation rather than an STP topology change. Therefore, the interface's down state is due to security enforcement, not a spanning-tree decision.
- C
The hub forced the interface to become a routed port.
Why wrong: A hub is a Layer 1 device that simply forwards electrical signals, so it cannot change the logical mode of a switch interface. A routed port is created only by explicitly removing Layer 2 switching with the "no switchport" command, which is not shown here. The log message references a port-security violation, not a change in interface mode.
- D
DHCP snooping always shuts a port when a hub is attached.
Why wrong: DHCP snooping filters DHCP messages based on whether a port is trusted or untrusted; it does not count MAC addresses or react to the simple attachment of a hub. A hub only extends the collision domain, and it does not generate DHCP traffic or cause a DHCP snooping violation by itself. The exhibit shows a port-security restriction on secure MAC addresses, not any DHCP-related action.