SCS-C02 Practice Question: Allow an external auditor to assume a read-only role in their AWS account
A company wants to allow an external auditor to assume a read-only role in their AWS account. The auditor's AWS account ID is 123456789012. Which trust policy should be attached to the role?
⚠ Common exam trap
The trap here is that candidates often overlook the MFA condition or incorrectly specify a specific user ARN, failing to recognize that the root principal ARN is the correct way to grant access to an entire external account while maintaining flexibility and security.
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.
Correct answer & explanation
✓
{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root" }, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole", "Condition": { "Bool": { "aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "true" } } } ] }
It grants the external auditor's AWS account (via its root principal ARN) permission to assume the read-only role, while enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA) as a security best practice. The `sts:AssumeRole` action is the standard mechanism for cross-account role assumption, and the `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` condition ensures the auditor uses MFA, reducing the risk of compromised credentials.
Answer analysis
Option-by-option breakdown
For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.
- ✓
{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root" }, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole", "Condition": { "Bool": { "aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "true" } } } ] }
Why this is correct
This trust policy is correct because it grants the external account's root principal (arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root) permission to call sts:AssumeRole only when the aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent condition evaluates to true. This enforces that any IAM principal from that account must have authenticated with an MFA device before assuming the role, which is a security best practice for external auditors. Using the account root ARN as Principal is the standard pattern because it delegates the actual user and role management to the external account.
- ✗
{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root" }, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole" } ] }
Why it's wrong here
This policy is missing the MFA condition, so it allows any IAM principal in the external account that has been granted sts:AssumeRole rights by admins in 123456789012 to assume the role without supplying a second factor. While the Principal is correctly set to the account root ARN, an unauthenticated or compromised credential in that account could thereby gain access to the role. The lack of aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent makes this substantially weaker than the intended secure configuration, even though the action and principal are otherwise valid.
- ✗
{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/Auditor" }, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole" } ] }
Why it's wrong here
This policy pins the trust relationship to an individual IAM user named Auditor in the external account, which is brittle because the actual username or federation method used by the auditor may differ. An external auditor could use an IAM role, a federated identity, or a different username, any of which would fail the Principal match if their ARN is not exactly this one. Best practice is to specify the external account root ARN as Principal, letting account administrators delegate access to whichever identity actually performs the audit, rather than hard-coding a single user ARN.
- ✗
{ "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Deny", "Principal": { "AWS": "123456789012" }, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole" } ] }
Why it's wrong here
This statement is doubly incorrect: the Principal is written as a bare account ID '123456789012' instead of a valid IAM ARN like 'arn:aws:iam::123456789012:root', and the Effect is 'Deny', which would block sts:AssumeRole rather than allow it. Even if the Principal were fixed, an explicit deny in a role trust policy would prevent the external auditor from assuming the role, defeating the stated requirement. A trust policy for cross-account access must use an Allow statement, optionally with a condition, to grant the assume-role permission.
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Written by Johnson Ajibi, MSc IT Security
Security Systems Architect · founder of Courseiva
This SCS-C02 practice question is part of Courseiva's free Amazon Web Services certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the SCS-C02 exam.