How do networks protect credit card numbers, passwords, and private messages from thieves on the internet? Cryptography is the mathematical shield that keeps data confidential and proves it hasn't been tampered with. For the 350-701 exam, you must understand not just what encryption does, but how public key infrastructure (PKI) solves the fundamental problem of trust: how do you know you're talking to the real Amazon and not a fake site built by a hacker?
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A simple way to picture Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure
How do you send a secret message to someone you've never met, knowing the postman might read it?
Imagine you want to send a valuable necklace to a friend across town, but you know the courier service has dishonest employees who open packages. You don't have a shared padlock with your friend. What can you do?
Your brilliant plan: put the necklace in a chest and lock it with a padlock that has a secret open button. But wait — your friend needs your padlock's secret key to open it, and you can't send the key without the dishonest courier seeing it. So instead, you ask your friend to send you an open padlock that they own (the only copy of that lock's key). Any padlock is fine; it doesn't have to be yours. They send their open padlock through the courier. The courier sees only a metal lock, useless without its key. You clip their padlock onto your chest and send it. Now only your friend, who kept the key, can open it.
That is asymmetric encryption in everyday life: two people exchange a 'public lock' (public key) openly, then use a matching 'private key' (the secret they never share) to lock or unlock. The necklace is your message. The padlocks are encryption keys. And no secret is ever sent over the courier.
Cryptography comes from Greek words meaning 'hidden writing'. At its simplest, it's a way to scramble a message so that only the intended recipient can unscramble it. The original, readable message is called plaintext. The scrambled version is ciphertext. The mathematical recipe that does the scrambling is an algorithm (a set of rules). The secret value that makes each encryption unique is a key.
There are two main families of encryption: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric encryption uses one single key for both locking and unlocking. Think of it like a single padlock key: the same key locks the chest and unlocks it. The problem? You have to get that shared key to the other person without anyone else seeing it. If the internet is the courier, and there's a spy on every wire, sharing the key securely is almost impossible. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is a common symmetric algorithm used for bulk data encryption because it is very fast. The 350-701 exam expects you to recognise AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 (the number indicates the key length in bits).
Asymmetric encryption (also called public key cryptography) solves the key-sharing problem. Each person generates two mathematically linked keys: a public key and a private key. The public key can be shared with anyone — posted on a website, emailed, even carved on a billboard. The private key must be kept absolutely secret, never shared. What one key encrypts, only the other can decrypt. So if Bob wants to send Alice a secret, he encrypts the message with Alice's public key. Only Alice's private key can decrypt it. The most famous asymmetric algorithm is RSA (named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir, Adleman). The exam also tests ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography), which provides equivalent security with shorter keys, making it more efficient.
But asymmetric encryption is mathematically complex and slow. Practical systems use hybrid encryption: they use asymmetric encryption to safely exchange a temporary symmetric key (called a session key), then use that symmetric key for the fast bulk encryption of the actual data. This is exactly how HTTPS (secure web browsing) works.
Hashing is the third fundamental cryptographic operation, distinct from encryption. A hash function takes any amount of data and produces a fixed-length fingerprint called a digest or hash value. Cryptography relies on hash functions having three properties: they are deterministic (same input always gives same output), preimage resistant (you cannot reverse the hash to get the original data), and collision resistant (it is extremely unlikely for two different inputs to produce the same hash). Common hash algorithms include SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm, 256-bit version) and the older, now-insecure MD5. The 350-701 exam frequently tests understanding of hashing used for data integrity verification.
Digital signatures combine hashing and asymmetric encryption. The sender hashes the message, then encrypts that hash with their own private key. The recipient decrypts the hash with the sender's public key and recomputes the hash themselves. If the two hashes match, it proves two things: integrity (the message wasn't changed) and non-repudiation (the sender cannot deny sending it, because only they have the private key that created the signature). This is the core of document signing and software authentication.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the system that manages the trust. An entity called a Certificate Authority (CA) issues digital certificates. A digital certificate binds a public key to an identity (like a company name or a domain). The CA signs the certificate with its own private key, creating a trusted chain. Your browser has a built-in list of trusted root CA certificates. When you visit https://www.yourbank.com, the web server presents its certificate. Your browser checks the signature chain up to a trusted root, verifies the domain matches, and checks the current date is within the certificate validity period. Only then does the browser trust the public key and begin the encrypted session. The 350-701 exam expects you to understand the components of PKI: CA, RA (Registration Authority, which verifies the identity before the CA issues a certificate), CRL (Certificate Revocation List, a list of certificates that have been invalidated before expiry), and OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol, a real-time check for revoked certificates).
User requests a secure webpage
Your browser sends a request to a web server (e.g., for https://www.yourbank.com). The server responds by sending its digital certificate, which contains its public key, the issuer (CA) name, and validity dates. This is the initial handshake where the server identifies itself.
Browser verifies the certificate chain
Your browser checks that the certificate was issued by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). It follows the chain from the server's certificate up through intermediate CAs to a root CA whose public key is already stored in your browser's trusted root store. If any link in the chain is missing, expired, or revoked, the browser displays a warning.
Session key generation (Diffie-Hellman key exchange)
Once the server's public key is trusted, the browser and server use a key exchange algorithm (like Diffie-Hellman or ECDHE) to generate a shared temporary session key. Even if a third party knows both public keys, they cannot derive the session key. This ensures Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS).
Symmetric encryption of the session
The browser and server use the established session key with a symmetric cipher (typically AES-128 or AES-256) to encrypt all subsequent data (web page text, images, form submissions). Symmetric encryption is fast enough for large volumes of data. The session key is discarded after the session ends.
Data integrity and authentication checks
Each encrypted message sent during the session includes an HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) or a tag from a GCM mode cipher. This allows the receiver to verify that the message hasn't been modified in transit and is from the expected sender, using the shared session key.
Certificate revocation check
Optionally, the browser may check whether the server's certificate has been revoked by querying an OCSP responder (Online Certificate Status Protocol) or checking CRL. If the certificate is revoked, the browser terminates the connection regardless of other checks.
Imagine you are a network security engineer at a medium-sized company called 'SwiftBooks'. Your CFO receives an email that appears to be from the CEO, asking her to urgently wire €50,000 to a new supplier. The email looks legitimate — the CEO's name, signature, even the company logo. How do you prevent this fraud?
You would implement digital signatures for all internal emails. You set up an internal CA (perhaps using Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services). You configure it to issue email signing certificates to every employee. The RA function is handled by your HR system: when a new person is hired, their identity is verified (ID check, manager approval), and the RA approves a certificate request. The CA then issues a certificate that binds the employee's email address to their public key, all signed by the company CA's private key.
Now when your CFO receives the urgent transfer request, her email client automatically checks the digital signature. First, it finds the sender's certificate attached. It verifies the certificate chain: the sender's certificate was signed by the company CA certificate, which is stored in the company's trusted root store on all workstations. The signature verification succeeds. Next, it checks whether that certificate has been revoked by querying an OCSP responder running on your internal network. The certificate is valid. Finally, it checks the email content's hash against the signature — the hash matches perfectly, proving the email wasn't altered. The email client shows a green 'signed' indicator. The CFO feels confident the request is real.
But what if a fraudster intercepts the email and changes the bank account number? The digital signature verification would fail. The hash wouldn't match. The CFO would see a red warning: 'signature invalid' or 'message altered'. She would pick up the phone to verify the request before wiring any money. This real-world scenario shows how PKI prevents business email compromise attacks, a trillion-dollar problem globally. In your daily work, you would also manage certificate lifecycles: monitoring expiry dates (a certificate expiring silently can break encrypted connections), revoking certificates for departing employees, and updating the CRL and OCSP responder. You would also face the decision of which key lengths to use: 2048-bit RSA keys are currently standard, but you might start migrating to 4096-bit or ECDSA (using ECC) for future-proofing against faster computers.
The 350-701 exam tests cryptography and PKI in several specific ways. Expect at least 5–8 questions on this topic, spread across multiple-choice, drag-and-drop, and scenario-based formats.
Key concepts the exam explicitly tests:
Symmetric versus asymmetric encryption: be able to identify each from a list of algorithms. Symmetric examples: AES, DES, 3DES, RC4, ChaCha20. Asymmetric examples: RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal. Trap: they may list a hash algorithm like SHA-256 as encryption — hash is not encryption because it cannot be reversed.
Key length and security strength: AES-128 offers roughly 128 bits of security. RSA-2048 offers about 112 bits. ECC-256 offers 128 bits. They test which is stronger given equivalent key lengths.
Differences between hashing and encryption: encryption is reversible with a key; hashing is one-way. Common trap question: 'Which operation provides non-repudiation?' Answer: digital signature (which uses hashing AND asymmetric encryption).
PKI components: CA, RA, certificate, CRL, OCSP. Trap: they may test whether CRL is a 'real-time' check — it is not; it's a periodically downloaded list. OCSP provides real-time status.
Certificate chain of trust: root CA, intermediate CA, end-entity certificate. They may show a diagram and ask which certificate signs which.
Certificate revocation reasons: key compromise, CA compromise, affiliation changed, superseded, cessation of operation.
Diffie-Hellman vs RSA: Diffie-Hellman is a key exchange protocol, not used for digital signatures. RSA can be used for both encryption and signing. Trap: the exam may list Diffie-Hellman as a signature algorithm — it is not.
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS): if a server's long-term private key is stolen, past sessions remain secure because temporary session keys were used. Diffie-Hellman (especially Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) provides PFS. RSA key exchange does not.
Hashing algorithms: SHA-1 is deprecated due to collision attacks. SHA-2 (SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512) and SHA-3 are current. MD5 is broken.
Exam traps you must avoid: confusing encryption with encoding (encoding, like Base64, is not encryption — no key is needed). Confusing authentication (proving identity) with authorisation (what you are allowed to do). Believing that a self-signed certificate is automatically invalid — it is trusted only if the client explicitly trusts it, but it's not inherently broken. Defining 'key' as the password — a key is a specific binary value, not a human-readable passphrase (though a passphrase can be turned into a key via KDF).
Exam techniques: if a question asks 'which algorithm provides both encryption and digital signatures?', think of RSA. If it asks 'which provides only key exchange?', think Diffie-Hellman. For 'which provides integrity?', think hashing. For 'which provides non-repudiation?', think digital signature.
Symmetric encryption uses one shared key for both encrypting and decrypting; asymmetric encryption uses a public key to encrypt and a matching private key to decrypt.
Hashing is a one-way function that provides data integrity but not confidentiality, and cannot be reversed to recover the original input.
A digital signature is created by hashing a message and then encrypting that hash with the sender's private key, proving both integrity and non-repudiation.
The five elements of PKI are the Certificate Authority (CA), Registration Authority (RA), digital certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).
Hybrid encryption uses asymmetric cryptography to securely exchange a symmetric session key, then uses that symmetric key for fast bulk data encryption.
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) ensures that even if a server's long-term private key is compromised, past encrypted sessions cannot be decrypted.
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) with 128-bit keys is considered secure; SHA-1 is deprecated and should not be used for security-sensitive applications.
These come up on the exam all the time. Here's how to tell them apart.
Symmetric Encryption
Uses one single key for both encryption and decryption.
Much faster than asymmetric encryption, suitable for bulk data.
Key distribution is a problem: must securely share the key beforehand.
Asymmetric Encryption
Uses a mathematically linked pair: public key and private key.
Slower, used mainly for key exchange and digital signatures.
Key distribution is simpler: public key can be shared openly.
Digital Signature
Requires asymmetric keys (private key to sign, public key to verify).
Provides non-repudiation: signer cannot deny signing.
Can be verified by anyone with the signer's public key.
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
Uses a symmetric key shared between sender and receiver.
Does not provide non-repudiation: both parties know the key.
Only parties who share the symmetric key can verify.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
Published periodically by the CA as a downloadable list.
Not real-time: depends on when the list was last updated.
Can be large and inefficient for high-traffic environments.
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Real-time query to an OCSP responder about a specific certificate.
Provides the most up-to-date status of a single certificate.
Requires the client to have network access to the OCSP responder.
Mistake
Encryption and hashing are basically the same thing, since both scramble data.
Correct
Encryption is reversible (you can decrypt with the right key), while hashing is one-way (you can never recover the original data from the hash). Hashing is used for integrity checks, not confidentiality.
Both processes take readable data and produce seemingly random output, so beginners think they are interchangeable. The exam specifically tests this distinction.
Mistake
A longer key always means more secure, so AES-256 is always better than AES-128.
Correct
AES-256 offers a higher security margin, but in most practical scenarios AES-128 is already strong enough against any known attack. The extra bits don't always justify the performance cost. The exam tests awareness that 128-bit keys are considered secure for classified information up to SECRET level.
People intuitively think 'more is better' without understanding that security margins over 128 bits are already effectively unbreakable with current technology.
Mistake
If a website has a padlock icon in the browser, the connection is completely secure and your data is private from the host itself.
Correct
HTTPS encryption protects your data from eavesdroppers on the network, but the web server itself can see all decrypted data. The host (e.g., the website owner) has full access to what you send. The exam tests this understanding of 'end-to-end encryption' vs 'transport encryption'.
The green padlock is a familiar symbol of 'safety', leading users to overestimate its meaning. Many think it means the website 'can't see' their password.
Mistake
SHA-256 encryption is used to encrypt passwords before storing them.
Correct
SHA-256 is a hash function, not an encryption algorithm. Passwords should be hashed (not encrypted) because you never need to see the original password again — you only compare hashes. Encryption would allow someone with the key to recover the password, which is a risk.
The words 'encrypt' and 'hash' are used loosely in everyday language. The exam expects precise terminology.
Mistake
A self-signed certificate is completely useless and always unsafe.
Correct
A self-signed certificate provides the same encryption strength as a CA-signed certificate. It only lacks the trust chain: a browser will warn because it doesn't know the issuer. It is perfectly acceptable in internal networks where you control the trust store and explicitly add the self-signed cert as a trusted root.
Browser warnings create a strong emotional response ('unsafe!'), leading beginners to believe the certificate itself is technically flawed rather than just missing a chain of trust.
Mistake
PKI only matters for websites with HTTPS.
Correct
PKI is used for email signing (S/MIME), code signing (to verify software comes from a trusted developer), VPN authentication (IPsec uses certificates), wireless network authentication (EAP-TLS), and smart card logon. The exam tests these broader use cases.
Most people first encounter PKI via web browsers, so they assume it's only a web technology.
Reveal each answer, then mark whether you got it right. Score 60%+ to unlock the next chapter.
Symmetric encryption uses one key for both encryption and decryption, like a single padlock key. Asymmetric encryption uses a pair of keys (public and private) — you can share the public key freely, but only the private key can decrypt what the public key encrypts.
A CA is a trusted organisation that issues digital certificates after verifying the identity of the requester. The CA signs the certificate with its own private key, creating a chain of trust that browsers and operating systems can follow back to a trusted root certificate installed in their trust store.
A CRL is a periodically published list of certificates that have been revoked by a CA before their expiration date. It is not real-time — clients must download and check it. Its successor, OCSP, provides real-time revocation status by querying a server.
In 2017, researchers demonstrated a practical collision attack against SHA-1, meaning two different inputs could produce the same hash. This breaks the collision resistance property. The 350-701 exam expects you to know SHA-1 is no longer recommended for security.
Non-repudiation means the sender cannot deny having sent a message or signed a document. It is achieved through digital signatures: because the sender's private key is required to create the signature, only the sender could have produced it.
No. Hashing is a one-way function designed to be irreversible. You cannot recover the original data from a hash. This is why passwords are stored as hashes — even if someone steals the database, they cannot easily guess the password.
You've finished Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure. Continue through the 350-701 study guide to build a complete picture of the exam.
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