SSCP Network and Communications Security Practice Question
During a security audit, a penetration tester successfully extracts the PMKID from a wireless beacon. What information can be derived from this attack?
⚠ Common exam trap
SSCP often tests the distinction between the PMKID and the actual keys, and candidates may incorrectly assume that capturing the PMKID directly yields the PSK or PMK, when in fact it only enables an offline cracking attempt.
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.
Correct answer & explanation
✓
The ability to crack the passphrase offline
The PMKID attack captures the PMKID from a wireless beacon or association frame, which is derived from the PMK and other values. This PMKID can be used to perform an offline brute-force or dictionary attack against the passphrase (PSK). The attacker cannot directly derive the PMK or PSK from the PMKID, but can attempt to crack the passphrase offline.
Answer analysis
Option-by-option breakdown
For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.
- ✗
The PMK (pairwise master key) directly
Why it's wrong here
The PMKID is an HMAC of the PMK, SSID and other values, so it cannot be reversed to yield the PMK itself; offline dictionary attacks derive the PSK instead. Extracting the PMK directly would require knowing the passphrase, which is the goal rather than the output.
- ✓
The ability to crack the passphrase offline
Why this is correct
Extracting the PMKID from a single beacon frame enables offline brute-force or dictionary attacks against the WPA2 passphrase, without requiring a full four-way handshake capture or client interaction. This satisfies the scenario's constraint: deriving the network passphrase from minimal captured data.
- ✗
The encryption keys used in the session
Why it's wrong here
Session encryption keys are negotiated per-association after the four-way handshake and never appear in a beacon or PMKID frame. Capturing live session keys is the objective of an active handshake capture with key installation, not of a passive PMKID extraction.
- ✗
The PSK (pre-shared key) directly
Why it's wrong here
The PMKID does not contain the PSK directly; it requires brute-forcing.
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Same concept, more angles
2 more ways this is tested on SSCP
These questions test the same concept from different angles. Work through them to make sure you can recognise it however the exam phrases it.
Variation 1. During a security assessment, a penetration tester discovers that the network uses WPA2-PSK. Which attack could be used to recover the pre-shared key without interacting with the access point after capturing a single handshake?
medium- A.Deauthentication attack
- B.KRACK attack
- C.Evil twin attack
- ✓ D.PMKID attack
Why D: The PMKID attack (discovered by hashcat's team in 2018) allows an attacker to capture the Pairwise Master Key Identifier from a single EAPOL frame sent by the access point during the WPA2 4-way handshake, without needing a client to be present or deauthenticated. The captured PMKID can then be cracked offline against a dictionary to recover the PSK. It requires no interaction with the AP beyond receiving one frame, which matches the question's constraint exactly.
Variation 2. During a wireless penetration test, an attacker captures the four-way handshake of a WPA2-PSK network and attempts to crack the passphrase offline. Which attack is the attacker likely using?
hard- A.WPS PIN attack
- B.KRACK attack
- ✓ C.Evil twin attack
- D.PMKID attack
Why C: In the given scenario, the attacker captures the four-way handshake of a WPA2-PSK network. The most likely method to capture such a handshake is an evil twin attack, where the attacker sets up a rogue access point impersonating a legitimate network. Once a client connects to the rogue AP, the attacker captures the handshake and can then attempt to crack the passphrase offline using dictionary or brute-force attacks.
JA
Written and reviewed by Johnson Ajibi, MSc IT Security
Senior Network & Security Engineer · founder of Courseiva
Last reviewed September 2026 · checked against the official ISC2 exam blueprint
This SSCP practice question is part of Courseiva's free ISC2 certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the SSCP exam.