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CCSP Cloud Platform and Infrastructure Security Practice Question

A cloud security engineer is hardening container runtime environments. Which TWO of the following are effective measures to prevent container escape?

⚠ Common exam trap

CCSP often tests whether candidates recognize that 'privileged mode' is a vulnerability, not a mitigation, and that generic practices like 'latest kernel' or 'read-only host mount' are distractors that sound secure but do not address container escape specifically.

Answer choices

Why each option matters

Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.

Correct answer & explanation

✓

Dropping all Linux capabilities except those required

Option D is correct because dropping all Linux capabilities except those strictly required follows the principle of least privilege and removes the powerful capabilities (such as CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, or CAP_SYS_PTRACE) that container-escape exploits typically abuse to break out of the namespace and interact with the host. Option E is correct because Seccomp profiles restrict the set of system calls a container process can invoke, blocking dangerous syscalls (e.g., ptrace, mount, unshare, keyctl) that are commonly leveraged in kernel-exploit-based escapes. Option A is not a preventive control for container escape: keeping the kernel patched reduces known vulnerabilities but does not by itself constrain a container's privileges or syscall surface. Option B is not effective as stated because mounting the host filesystem read-only does not prevent escape — an attacker can still gain host access and then remount or exploit writable paths; the real mitigation is not exposing the host filesystem to the container at all. Option C is incorrect because privileged mode disables the very isolation mechanisms (capabilities, seccomp, AppArmor/SELinux, device cgroup) that prevent escape, making it the opposite of a hardening measure.

Answer analysis

Option-by-option breakdown

For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.

  • ✗

    Using the latest kernel version

    Why it's wrong here

    Patching the kernel closes known vulnerabilities but does not restrict the capabilities, namespaces or syscalls a container may invoke, so a privileged or misconfigured container can still escape. It is tempting because kernel exploits are a genuine escape vector, and staying current is correct hygiene for host hardening generally.

  • ✗

    Mounting the host filesystem as read-only

    Why it's wrong here

    A read-only host mount limits writes to host files, yet escape depends on capabilities and namespace isolation, not write access alone; a container can still abuse CAP_SYS_ADMIN or /proc to break out. It is tempting because read-only mounts are a recognised hardening control for limiting container tampering with host files.

  • ✗

    Running containers in privileged mode

    Why it's wrong here

    Privileged mode grants the container all Linux capabilities and direct device access, removing the isolation boundary and enabling trivial escapes; it is the opposite of hardening. It is tempting because privileged containers are legitimately required for workloads needing host-level access, such as certain monitoring or storage daemons.

  • ✓

    Dropping all Linux capabilities except those required

    Why this is correct

    Dropping unneeded Linux capabilities directly shrinks the kernel attack surface available inside a container, satisfying the stem's requirement to prevent escape. Without privileges such as CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a compromised process cannot mount filesystems, load modules or manipulate namespaces, so breakout techniques that depend on elevated capabilities fail.

  • ✓

    Applying Seccomp profiles

    Why this is correct

    Seccomp profiles restrict the system calls a container may invoke, blocking the kernel interfaces that container-escape exploits rely on, such as `unshare` or `mount`. This directly satisfies the stem's requirement to prevent escape by shrinking the runtime's attack surface, since a blocked syscall cannot be abused to break isolation.

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JA

Written and reviewed by Johnson Ajibi, MSc IT Security

Senior Network & Security Engineer · founder of Courseiva

Last reviewed September 2026 · checked against the official ISC2 exam blueprint

This CCSP practice question is part of Courseiva's free ISC2 certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the CCSP exam.