Select Two (Multi-Select) Questions

The Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) of the asset.

SLE is a fundamental variable in the ALE calculation.

The Annualized Rate of Occurrence (ARO) of the threat.

ARO is the frequency metric needed for the ALE calculation.

Implementing unidirectional gateways (data diodes) to isolate the control network.

This ensures that traffic can only leave the control network, not enter it.

Enforcing strict access control and MFA for all remote access to the ICS environment.

Remote access is a major threat vector for ICS/OT networks.

Disabling all unused physical ports and services on ICS controllers.

Reducing the attack surface is essential for hard-to-patch controllers.

Implementing certificate pinning to prevent the use of fraudulent certificates.

Pinning ensures that the client only accepts the expected server certificate.

Enforcing mandatory TLS 1.3 for all service-to-service communication.

Encryption is the primary defense against interception.

Using mutual authentication (mTLS) to verify both the client and server.

mTLS prevents imposters from acting as either side of the connection.

Running the container process as the 'root' user.

Running as root allows container escapes to compromise the host OS.

Using the default 'latest' tag for container images in production.

Using 'latest' prevents immutable deployments and version tracking.

Exposing the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) to the container.

The socket provides total control over the host engine.

Automated scanning of open-source dependencies for known vulnerabilities (SCA).

Dependency management is critical in modern software development.

Digital signing of all build artifacts to ensure provenance and integrity.

Signing guarantees that the software hasn't been tampered with.

Hardening the CI/CD build servers and restricting access.

Protecting the build infrastructure is essential for pipeline integrity.

Physical shredding

Shredding to small particles is the most secure disposal method.

Cryptographic erasure (Sanitize command)

This renders data unrecoverable via key management.

Incineration

Incineration is an approved method for media destruction.

Confirmation that no new vulnerabilities were introduced

Assessing for regressions or new attack vectors.

Updated audit documentation

Providing evidence of the change for future audits.

Validation of security control effectiveness

Verifying that the security change actually functions as intended.

Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).

Ensures that only authorized users access the data.

AES-256 encryption.

Standard for high-impact data protection.

ISO/IEC 27001.

The global standard for information security management.

PCI DSS.

Mandatory for all organizations handling credit card data.

Pre-authorization status of the change procedure

Standard changes are pre-authorized; emergency changes are not.

Level of risk to the production environment

Emergency changes often bypass traditional risk gates due to criticality.

Transfer the risk via insurance or contractual arrangements.

Risk transfer is a valid risk management strategy.

Accept the risk after documenting the decision and the potential impact.

Risk acceptance is a formal, documented process by the risk owner.

Identifying security-relevant system components

Identifying components helps focus security controls where they are most needed.

Specifying security-enforcing interfaces

Interfaces are common attack vectors that require specific design attention.

Defining system trust boundaries

Trust boundaries are essential to limit the propagation of threats.

Reviewing existing security controls for degradation

Changes can inadvertently weaken security controls.

Updating the system security plan

The SSP must reflect the current state after any change.

Re-evaluating the risk to the system

Changes often introduce new risks or modify existing ones.

Designing effective security countermeasures.

Threat modeling is useless without remediation planning.

Identifying potential STRIDE categories for each component.

This is the primary function of the STRIDE model.

Mapping threats to system components.

This is central to the STRIDE analysis process.

Automated security scanning and log aggregation.

Automation is essential for scale and consistency in ConMon.

A defined process for reporting and remediating identified security weaknesses.

Monitoring is useless if findings are not acted upon.

Tailoring controls without documenting the security justification.

Documentation is a mandatory RMF requirement for tailoring.

Over-tailoring controls to the point of compromising the system's baseline security.

Over-tailoring results in an insecure system.

Enforcing short-lived, dynamically generated credentials.

Dynamic secrets expire, limiting the impact of a potential breach.

Enforcing the principle of least privilege for secret access.

Access should be restricted to only those services that need the secret.

Implementing robust auditing of all secret access attempts.

Auditing is necessary to detect unauthorized access to credentials.

The SSP identifies the controls to be implemented.

The SSP is the baseline requirement document.

The POA&M tracks the remediation of security gaps identified during the assessment.

The POA&M is the remediation roadmap for the controls.

Operational.

One of the three core NIST categories.

Technical.

One of the three core NIST categories.

Management.

One of the three core NIST categories.

Multi-region deployment.

Protects against regional service outages.

Active-passive clustering.

Standard HA configuration.

Data replication to secondary instances.

Ensures data availability if the primary fails.