GSEC Virtualization, Cloud, and AI Essentials Practice Question
A hospital runs a VMware vSphere cluster with several ESXi 8 hosts. The security team discovers that an attacker who compromised one guest VM was able to read memory contents belonging to a different VM on the same host. Which vSphere setting should have been enabled to prevent this cross-VM memory disclosure at the hardware level?
⚠ Common exam trap
The trap here is assuming that any vSphere hardening feature, such as encrypted vMotion or VLAN tagging, will stop a local cross-VM memory read when only hardware memory encryption extensions address that specific threat.
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.
Correct answer & explanation
✓
Enable CPU virtualization-based security features such as AMD SEV-ES or Intel TDX for the VM.
Hardware-based confidential computing features such as AMD SEV-ES and Intel TDX encrypt VM memory so that even the hypervisor and co-resident VMs cannot read it. This directly addresses the cross-VM memory disclosure, whereas the other options address migration encryption, network segmentation, or console clipboard controls, none of which isolate physical memory between guests on the same ESXi host.
Answer analysis
Option-by-option breakdown
For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.
- ✗
Enable Encrypted vMotion on the VMkernel adapter.
Why it's wrong here
Encrypted vMotion protects VM memory in transit during live migration between hosts, not memory resident on the same host. In this scenario no migration is described; the attacker read another VM's memory on the same ESXi host, so encrypting the vMotion channel would not block a local cross-VM read. It addresses a different threat model entirely.
- ✗
Configure a vSphere Standard Switch with VLAN tagging for each VM.
Why it's wrong here
VLAN tagging on a vSphere Standard Switch segments Layer 2 network traffic between VMs. It has no effect on memory isolation inside the hypervisor. The scenario is about one VM reading another VM's physical memory, which is a hypervisor-level isolation failure, not a network segmentation issue, so VLAN configuration would not stop the attack.
- ✗
Set the VM's isolation.tools.copy.disable parameter to TRUE.
Why it's wrong here
This advanced parameter disables copy and paste operations through VMware Tools between the guest and the remote console. It restricts user-facing clipboard functionality and does not enforce memory isolation between VMs. It would not prevent a malicious guest from reading another VM's memory, making it irrelevant to the described hardware-level disclosure.
- ✓
Enable CPU virtualization-based security features such as AMD SEV-ES or Intel TDX for the VM.
Why this is correct
Confidential computing extensions like AMD SEV-ES and Intel TDX encrypt guest memory in hardware so the hypervisor and other VMs cannot read it. Enabling these for the affected VM would prevent the compromised guest from reading memory belonging to a different VM, directly mitigating the cross-VM memory disclosure described.
About these practice questions
This GSEC question is part of Courseiva's 351-question bank — original exam-style content with full explanations and wrong-answer analysis, never real exam questions or exam dumps. Learn why practice questions differ from exam dumps →
JA
Written and reviewed by Johnson Ajibi, MSc IT Security
Senior Network & Security Engineer · founder of Courseiva
Last reviewed September 2026 · checked against the official GIAC exam blueprint
This GSEC practice question is part of Courseiva's free GIAC certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the GSEC exam.