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CCNA Network Security Controls Protocols And Devices Questions

32 questions · Network Security Controls Protocols And Devices · All types, answers revealed

1
Multi-Selectmedium

A network administrator is configuring an intrusion prevention system (IPS) and needs to understand how signature-based and anomaly-based detection engines operate. Which TWO statements accurately describe anomaly-based IPS detection? (Choose two)

Select 2 answers
A.It establishes a baseline of normal network traffic patterns and detects deviations from that baseline.
B.It is highly effective at detecting previously unknown zero-day attacks that lack known signatures.
C.It relies on an up-to-date database of known malware signatures and explicit attack strings.
D.It guarantees zero false positive alerts in high-throughput enterprise network environments.
E.It requires manual updates from vendor threat intelligence feeds every time a new vulnerability is discovered.
AnswersA, B

Anomaly-based IPS detection builds a baseline of normal network traffic patterns, then flags deviations from that baseline as potential threats. This contrasts with signature-based detection, which matches known attack patterns rather than modelling normal behaviour.

Why this answer

Option A is correct because anomaly-based IPS detection works by first profiling legitimate traffic to build a statistical baseline of normal behavior, then flagging activity that deviates from that baseline as suspicious. Option B is correct because, since anomaly detection does not depend on pre-existing signatures, it can identify novel or zero-day attacks whose patterns have never been seen before. Option C is incorrect because relying on an up-to-date database of known malware signatures and attack strings describes signature-based detection, not anomaly-based detection.

Option D is incorrect because anomaly-based systems are actually prone to false positives, since legitimate but unusual traffic can deviate from the baseline, and no IPS guarantees zero false positives in high-throughput environments. Option E is incorrect because anomaly-based engines learn behavior dynamically and do not require vendor signature or threat-intelligence updates for every new vulnerability, which again describes signature-based systems.

Exam trap

CND often tests the signature-vs-anomaly trade-off, and the trap is picking the option claiming anomaly detection has no false positives or requires signature updates — both are signature-engine traits misattributed to anomaly engines.

2
Multi-Selectmedium

An organization is designing a redundant network architecture to prevent single points of failure at the gateway level. Which THREE protocols or features are commonly used to provide gateway redundancy and high availability for default routers or firewalls? (Choose three)

Select 3 answers
A.Hot Standby Router Protocol (HSRP)
B.Gateway Load Balancing Protocol (GLBP)
C.Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) root guard
D.Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) snooping
E.Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP)
AnswersA, B, E

HSRP lets a group of Cisco routers share a single virtual IP and MAC address, so a standby router assumes the default gateway role automatically if the active one fails. This directly removes the gateway as a single point of failure.

Why this answer

HSRP (A) is Cisco's first-hop redundancy protocol in which an active and standby router share a virtual IP and MAC address, allowing the standby to take over the default gateway role if the active fails, directly preventing a gateway single point of failure. GLBP (B) is Cisco's advanced FHRP that provides gateway redundancy while also load-balancing traffic across multiple gateways via a virtual IP and multiple virtual MAC addresses, so it both eliminates the single gateway failure and improves availability. VRRP (E) is the standards-based (RFC 5798) first-hop redundancy protocol where a master and backup routers share a virtual router IP/MAC, providing vendor-neutral gateway failover.

STP root guard (C) is a Layer 2 loop-prevention/root-bridge protection feature and does not provide default-gateway redundancy, and DHCP snooping (D) is a Layer 2 security feature that filters rogue DHCP servers and builds a binding table, unrelated to gateway failover.

Exam trap

CND often tests the difference between Layer 2 redundancy protocols (STP) and Layer 3 gateway redundancy protocols (HSRP, VRRP, GLBP), so candidates may incorrectly select STP-related options.

3
MCQeasy

A corporate network is segmented into multiple zones. The security policy dictates that the Finance department subnet must be completely isolated from the Guest Wi-Fi subnet, and traffic between them must pass through a security device enforcing access control lists. Where should this security device be placed?

A.On the internal network boundary between the Finance and Guest VLANs
B.At the perimeter boundary directly connected to the ISP modem
C.On the local loopback interface of each end-user workstation
D.Inside the ISP core routing infrastructure
AnswerA

Placing the device on the internal boundary between the Finance and Guest VLANs forces all inter-zone traffic through it, where ACLs can deny or permit flows. This satisfies the isolation requirement without relying on perimeter firewalls that never see internal east-west traffic.

Why this answer

To enforce ACLs between two internal zones (Finance and Guest), the security device must sit inline on the path between those VLANs — i.e., at the internal boundary where inter-VLAN routing occurs. Placing it there ensures all Finance-to-Guest traffic is inspected and controlled before it can traverse the internal network.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that a perimeter firewall protects all internal traffic — candidates forget that east-west (inter-VLAN) traffic never reaches the perimeter and must be controlled by an internal segmentation device.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option B is wrong because the ISP perimeter boundary only sees north-south traffic entering/leaving the organization; it cannot enforce policy on east-west traffic between two internal VLANs that never leaves the LAN. Option C is wrong because a loopback interface is a logical, host-local interface that never carries transit traffic, so a security device placed there would inspect nothing. Option D is wrong because the ISP core is outside the organization's administrative control and carries no customer-internal VLAN traffic, making policy enforcement there impossible.

4
MCQeasy

An organization wants to protect internal workstations by deploying a host-based firewall that evaluates inbound and outbound connection requests based on application executable names rather than just IP addresses and port numbers. Which Windows built-in security feature provides this capability?

A.Windows User Account Control (UAC)
B.Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security
C.Windows BitLocker Drive Encryption
D.Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)
AnswerB

Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security supports rules scoped to application executables, not just IP addresses and ports, evaluating inbound and outbound connections per program. This satisfies the stem's requirement for executable-based host firewall filtering.

Why this answer

Windows Defender Firewall with Advanced Security supports application-based (program-based) rules in addition to port/protocol rules. Each rule can specify the executable path (e.g., C:\Program Files\App\app.exe), and the firewall evaluates inbound/outbound traffic against that program identity. This satisfies the requirement of filtering by application executable name rather than only IP/port.

Exam trap

The trap here is conflating 'host-based firewall' with any Windows security feature; candidates pick UAC or BitLocker because they sound security-related, missing that only Defender Firewall with Advanced Security does application-layer connection filtering.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because UAC is a privilege-elevation and consent mechanism (admin approval mode), not a packet-filtering firewall — it has no concept of inbound/outbound connection rules. Option C is wrong because BitLocker is full-disk encryption (TPM/PIN-based) protecting data at rest; it does not inspect or filter network connections. Option D is wrong because WSL is a compatibility layer for running Linux binaries on Windows; it provides no host-based firewall capability by itself.

5
Multi-Selectmedium

A security engineer needs to configure secure log management and transmission from edge firewalls and switches to a centralized SIEM server. Which TWO protocols or features ensure that log data is transmitted securely and integrally across the network? (Choose two)

Select 2 answers
A.Unencrypted UDP Syslog (Port 514)
B.Encrypted log forwarding via HTTPS REST APIs to the SIEM collector
C.Syslog over TLS (TCP Port 6514)
D.Unauthenticated TFTP log backup transfers
E.SNMPv1 trap forwarding
AnswersB, C

Forwarding logs over HTTPS REST APIs to the SIEM collector encrypts payloads with TLS and authenticates the endpoint, protecting confidentiality and integrity in transit. This meets the stem's requirement for secure log transmission from edge firewalls and switches.

Why this answer

Option B is correct because forwarding logs via HTTPS REST APIs encrypts the data in transit with TLS and allows the SIEM collector to authenticate the sender and validate integrity through the TLS channel and HTTP-level authentication. Option C is correct because Syslog over TLS, standardized on TCP port 6514, wraps syslog messages in a TLS session that provides confidentiality, server authentication, and message integrity, which is exactly what secure centralized log transmission requires. The unmarked options do not belong: unencrypted UDP Syslog on port 514 (A) sends cleartext datagrams with no integrity or authentication, TFTP (D) is an unauthenticated, unencrypted file transfer protocol, and SNMPv1 traps (E) are sent in cleartext with weak community-string authentication and no integrity protection.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that any TCP-based syslog is secure — candidates must distinguish plain TCP syslog (no encryption) from syslog over TLS (RFC 5425, port 6514) and recognize that UDP 514, TFTP, and SNMPv1 are all insecure.

6
MCQhard

An enterprise is deploying an IPsec site-to-site VPN. The security team wants to ensure that if an attacker captures today's encrypted network traffic, they cannot decrypt it even if they eventually compromise the long-term preshared keys or private keys used during the initial key exchange. What cryptographic property must be enforced?

A.Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) using GCM mode
B.Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) via ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchanges
C.Anti-replay protection using sequence number windows
D.RSA signature-based peer authentication
AnswerB

PFS generates unique ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys per session, so session keys are never derived from the long-term preshared or private keys. Compromising those long-term secrets later cannot decrypt previously captured traffic, satisfying the requirement that past sessions stay protected.

Why this answer

Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) ensures that session keys are derived from ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchanges and are not recoverable from long-term keys. Even if an attacker later compromises the preshared key or private key, past session keys cannot be reconstructed, so captured traffic remains undecryptable. This is exactly the property the security team requires.

Exam trap

CND often tests the difference between confidentiality mechanisms (AEAD, encryption) and key-exchange properties (PFS) — candidates pick GCM because it sounds strong, missing that only ephemeral DH provides protection against future key compromise.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because AEAD with GCM provides confidentiality and integrity for the current session but does not protect past sessions if the long-term key is compromised — it is a cipher mode, not a key-exchange property. Option C is wrong because anti-replay protection prevents attackers from re-injecting captured packets; it does not prevent decryption of captured traffic. Option D is wrong because RSA signature-based authentication verifies peer identity but does not provide forward secrecy unless combined with ephemeral DH; RSA key transport actually lacks PFS.

7
MCQhard

An organization is deploying an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) in an enterprise data center. To minimize latency and avoid becoming a single point of failure that disrupts network uptime if the hardware fails, the engineering team chooses a specific deployment topology. Which deployment option provides inline inspection with hardware-level bypass capability?

A.Configuring the IPS as an out-of-band active response server using SNMP traps.
B.Placing the IPS behind a load balancer using round-robin DNS routing.
C.Deploying the IPS inline equipped with hardware fail-open optical/electrical bypass tap modules
D.Deploying the IPS in passive tap mode using a network packet broker span session.
AnswerC

Inline deployment gives true traffic inspection, while hardware bypass tap modules physically bridge the links if the IPS loses power or fails. This fail-open behaviour preserves network uptime, satisfying the requirement to avoid a single point of failure without sacrificing inline prevention.

Why this answer

Option C is correct because deploying the IPS inline with hardware fail-open bypass modules ensures that traffic is actively inspected in the data path, but if the IPS fails or loses power, the bypass module physically bridges the connection to maintain network uptime. This provides both intrusion prevention (blocking malicious traffic) and high availability, meeting the requirement of minimizing latency and avoiding a single point of failure. Hardware bypass operates at the physical layer, so it does not rely on software or external power to fail open.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that any inline IPS deployment automatically provides high availability, confusing hardware bypass with software failover or passive monitoring.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because an out-of-band active response server using SNMP traps does not inspect traffic inline; it only reacts after receiving alerts, so it cannot prevent intrusions in real time and introduces no hardware bypass. Option B is wrong because placing the IPS behind a load balancer with round-robin DNS does not provide inline inspection; DNS round-robin distributes connections but does not guarantee that all traffic passes through the IPS, and it lacks any hardware bypass mechanism. Option D is wrong because passive tap mode with a network packet broker only copies traffic for monitoring; it cannot block attacks and therefore does not provide intrusion prevention, and it has no inline bypass capability.

8
MCQhard

A security architect is designing network access control for a campus LAN. The requirement is to authenticate users and devices, assign VLANs dynamically based on identity, and quarantine non-compliant endpoints before granting production access. Which combination of protocols and features should the architect implement?

A.RADIUS accounting with SNMP polling and port security to enforce VLANs
B.MAC authentication bypass (MAB) with static VLAN assignment and no remediation VLAN
C.802.1X with EAP and RADIUS, plus dynamic VLAN assignment and a remediation VLAN
D.TACACS+ for user authentication with static ACLs and no dynamic VLAN or quarantine
AnswerC

802.1X provides port-based authentication, EAP carries identity credentials, and RADIUS returns authorization attributes such as VLAN assignment. Dynamic VLAN assignment places users into the correct network based on identity, and a remediation VLAN quarantines non-compliant endpoints until they meet policy. Together these features satisfy authentication, dynamic segmentation, and quarantine requirements in this campus LAN scenario.

Why this answer

Identity-based access control on a campus LAN requires 802.1X port authentication with EAP and RADIUS, which enables dynamic VLAN assignment through authorization attributes. A remediation VLAN isolates non-compliant endpoints until they meet policy. MAB, RADIUS accounting, SNMP polling, port security, and TACACS+ either lack identity-based authentication or do not provide dynamic segmentation and quarantine, so they do not meet the full requirement.

Exam trap

The trap here is confusing TACACS+ device administration with 802.1X endpoint access control.

9
MCQhard

An enterprise network security team is analyzing BGP routing anomalies at the internet edge. An attacker is attempting to inject malicious routing updates to hijack corporate IP space (BGP prefix hijacking). Which mechanism should the network edge routers implement to cryptographically verify the origin autonomy of IP prefixes?

A.Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) with Route Origin Validation (ROV)
B.DNSSEC zone signing across all authoritative name servers
C.OSPFv3 authentication trailers using HMAC-SHA-256
D.IPsec Transport Mode with pre-shared keys
AnswerA

RPKI signs Route Origin Authorisations binding prefixes to authorised origin ASNs, and ROV on edge routers drops or deprioritises BGP announcements whose origin does not match a valid ROA. This cryptographically verifies prefix origin, directly countering the hijacking attempt described in the stem.

Why this answer

RPKI with Route Origin Validation (ROV) is the cryptographic mechanism that binds IP prefixes to their authorized origin AS numbers via signed Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). Edge routers performing ROV query RPKI validators (e.g., Routinator, OctoRPKI) and mark BGP announcements as Valid, Invalid, or NotFound, allowing operators to drop Invalid routes and prevent prefix hijacking. This directly addresses origin authentication of BGP announcements.

Exam trap

CND often tests the confusion between DNS security (DNSSEC) and routing security (RPKI) — candidates pick DNSSEC because it sounds like the cryptographic origin-validation answer, but it protects DNS, not BGP.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option B is wrong because DNSSEC signs DNS zone data to prevent DNS spoofing/cache poisoning — it has no role in BGP route origin validation. Option C is wrong because OSPFv3 authentication secures OSPFv3 LSAs within an IGP domain, not inter-domain BGP prefix origin. Option D is wrong because IPsec Transport Mode encrypts/authenticates point-to-point IP packets but does not validate BGP prefix ownership or origin AS.

10
MCQeasy

A network administrator needs to deploy a security device that inspects inbound HTTP and HTTPS traffic at the application layer and drops requests containing SQL injection signatures before they reach the web server. Which device should the administrator deploy?

A.Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS)
B.Packet filtering router
C.Traditional Stateful Packet Inspection Firewall
D.Web Application Firewall (WAF)
AnswerD

A Web Application Firewall parses HTTP and HTTPS requests at Layer 7, matching payloads against SQL injection signatures and blocking them before they reach the web server. Unlike a network firewall, which filters only by IP address and port, a WAF satisfies the stem's requirement for application-layer inspection and signature-based dropping.

Why this answer

A Web Application Firewall (WAF) operates at Layer 7 and inspects HTTP/HTTPS requests for application-layer attacks like SQL injection, XSS, and command injection, dropping malicious requests before they reach the web server. It understands HTTP semantics (headers, parameters, cookies, bodies) and can apply signature-based and anomaly-based rules specifically tuned for web applications.

Exam trap

CND often tests the boundary between NIPS and WAF — candidates pick NIPS because it 'inspects traffic,' but only a WAF is designed to parse HTTP application-layer content and drop SQLi before it reaches the web server.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because a NIPS inspects network traffic for protocol and exploit signatures at Layers 3–7 but is not purpose-built to parse HTTP application semantics like a WAF; it may miss obfuscated SQLi in POST bodies and lacks WAF-specific rule sets. Option B is wrong because a packet filtering router only examines Layer 3/4 headers (IP, port, protocol) and cannot inspect HTTP payloads at all. Option C is wrong because a traditional stateful firewall tracks connection state at Layers 3/4 but does not perform deep application-layer inspection of HTTP content, so SQL injection signatures pass through undetected.

11
Multi-Selecthard

An enterprise security architect is designing a Zero Trust network segmentation model. Which THREE core principles are foundational to Zero Trust architecture regarding network access and device verification? (Choose three)

Select 3 answers
A.Assuming breach and inspecting all traffic regardless of whether it originates internally or externally
B.Implicit trust of internal network segments once a user connects to the corporate LAN or VPN
C.Enforcement of least privilege access limiting users to only the specific applications they require
D.Continuous verification of user identity and device security posture for every access request
E.Static perimeter firewalls as the sole security control required to protect enterprise assets
AnswersA, C, D

Zero Trust removes implicit trust based on network location, so all traffic is inspected and treated as potentially hostile whether it originates inside or outside the perimeter. This satisfies the architecture's requirement that internal traffic receives no automatic trust during segmentation design.

Why this answer

Option A is correct because Zero Trust assumes breach and inspects all traffic regardless of whether it originates internally or externally, eliminating the notion of a trusted internal network. Option C is correct because least privilege access is a core Zero Trust principle that limits users to only the specific applications and resources they require, reducing lateral movement. Option D is correct because Zero Trust requires continuous verification of user identity and device security posture for every access request, rather than trusting a session after initial authentication.

Option B is incorrect because implicit trust of internal network segments after LAN or VPN connection directly contradicts Zero Trust. Option E is incorrect because static perimeter firewalls as the sole control reflect a traditional perimeter model, not Zero Trust.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that connecting via VPN or being on the internal LAN grants implicit trust — candidates who select option B confuse traditional perimeter security with Zero Trust principles.

12
MCQmedium

A network engineer is configuring an OpenVPN server in TUN mode for remote workers. What is the fundamental characteristic of TUN mode compared to TAP mode regarding network layer operation?

A.TUN mode operates at Layer 3 (Network Layer) routing IP packets without layer 2 broadcast traffic.
B.TUN mode only supports TCP transport and cannot function over UDP connections.
C.TUN mode operates at Layer 2 (Data Link Layer) handling Ethernet frames and broadcasts.
D.TUN mode requires the use of MAC-level bridging across all connected client interfaces.
AnswerA

TUN mode presents a point-to-point Layer 3 interface, routing IP packets between peers and carrying no Ethernet frames. This satisfies the stem's constraint by eliminating Layer 2 broadcast and multicast traffic, unlike TAP mode, which bridges a virtual Layer 2 segment.

Why this answer

TUN mode is a Layer 3 (Network Layer) virtual interface that routes IP packets between the client and the VPN server, carrying only unicast IP traffic and no Layer 2 broadcast or multicast frames. This makes it ideal for remote-access VPNs where clients need routed access to corporate subnets, not bridged LAN access. TAP mode, by contrast, operates at Layer 2 and carries Ethernet frames including broadcasts.

Exam trap

CND often tests the Layer 2 vs. Layer 3 distinction between TAP and TUN, tricking candidates into picking the option that describes TAP mode (Ethernet frames, broadcasts, MAC bridging) when the question asks about TUN.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option B is wrong because TUN mode is transport-agnostic — OpenVPN can run over UDP or TCP regardless of whether TUN or TAP is used; the mode determines the virtual interface layer, not the transport protocol. Option C is wrong because it describes TAP mode, not TUN mode — TAP operates at Layer 2 and handles Ethernet frames and broadcasts, which is the opposite of TUN. Option D is wrong because MAC-level bridging is a TAP mode capability (used for bridging VPN clients into a LAN segment); TUN mode does not bridge at Layer 2 and does not require MAC-level bridging.

13
MCQmedium

A security analyst observes that an internal host is generating excessive DNS queries containing encoded data within subdomains, indicative of a DNS tunneling attack. The network perimeter firewall allows outbound DNS traffic on UDP port 53 to any external IP. Which network security control should be implemented to mitigate this threat?

A.Block all outbound TCP and UDP port 53 traffic globally across the entire perimeter firewall
B.Force all internal clients to query only designated internal DNS resolvers and block direct outbound port 53 to external IPs
C.Implement an HTTP web proxy to inspect all DNS packets at Layer 7
D.Enable spanning-tree root guard on all switch access ports
AnswerB

Restricting clients to internal resolvers and blocking direct outbound port 53 removes the tunnel's transport path, since internal resolvers can enforce filtering and logging. This satisfies the stem's constraint that the perimeter firewall currently permits DNS to any external IP.

Why this answer

The correct mitigation is to force all internal clients to use designated internal DNS resolvers and block direct outbound UDP/TCP 53 to external IPs at the perimeter. This prevents internal hosts from establishing arbitrary DNS tunnels to attacker-controlled authoritative servers while still allowing legitimate recursive resolution through controlled resolvers that can be monitored and filtered.

Exam trap

The trap is choosing the most aggressive control (block all port 53) rather than the surgical one (restrict to internal resolvers), or confusing DNS inspection with HTTP proxy inspection.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because blocking all outbound port 53 globally would break legitimate DNS resolution for the entire organization, causing a self-inflicted denial of service. Option C is wrong because HTTP proxies operate at Layer 7 for HTTP/HTTPS traffic and do not inspect DNS packets — DNS tunneling uses the DNS protocol, not HTTP, so a web proxy is the wrong control. Option D is wrong because Spanning Tree root guard is a Layer 2 loop-prevention feature on switches and has no bearing on DNS exfiltration.

14
MCQhard

A network engineer is configuring TLS 1.3 on an enterprise load balancer. During cipher suite selection, the engineer observes that cipher suites like TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 are no longer listed in the configuration menu. What is the primary reason for this change in TLS 1.3?

A.TLS 1.3 separates key exchange parameters from cipher suites, simplifying options to AEAD algorithms
B.TLS 1.3 eliminates symmetric encryption in favor of asynchronous cryptographic operations for all data payloads
C.TLS 1.3 requires all connections to use legacy RSA key transport mechanisms
D.TLS 1.3 mandates the use of pre-shared keys (PSKs) exclusively for all sessions
AnswerA

TLS 1.3 removes the cipher-suite negotiation of key exchange, authentication and bulk encryption combined. Key exchange is negotiated separately via supported groups, leaving only AEAD algorithms such as AES-GCM, which is why legacy ECDHE_RSA suites disappear from the menu.

Why this answer

In TLS 1.3, cipher suites no longer include key exchange and authentication algorithms; they only specify AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) algorithms like AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305. Key exchange is negotiated separately via extensions like supported_groups, and authentication is handled by the certificate and signature algorithms. This simplifies cipher suite configuration.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that TLS 1.3 cipher suites still include key exchange and authentication like TLS 1.2, leading candidates to think the suites were removed for security reasons rather than re-architected.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option B is wrong because TLS 1.3 still uses symmetric encryption for data payloads; it does not eliminate it in favor of asynchronous operations, which would be impractical due to performance. Option C is wrong because TLS 1.3 removed legacy RSA key transport in favor of forward-secret key exchanges like ECDHE. Option D is wrong because TLS 1.3 does not mandate PSKs exclusively; PSKs are optional and can be used for session resumption or pre-shared key authentication, but certificates are still widely used.

15
MCQmedium

A security engineer is tasked with restricting network access to a sensitive database server so that only the application server VLAN can communicate with it on TCP port 1433. The database server is hosted on a virtualized hypervisor switch. Where should this micro-segmentation control be implemented for optimal enforcement?

A.By modifying the DNS records of the database server to point to a sinkhole
B.On the core router's default gateway interface for the entire data center
C.Using a distributed virtual firewall configured at the hypervisor switch layer
D.On the perimeter firewall facing the internet gateway
AnswerC

A distributed virtual firewall enforces policy at the hypervisor vSwitch, filtering traffic before it reaches the database VM. This satisfies the micro-segmentation requirement by permitting only the application server VLAN to reach TCP port 1433, without relying on physical network hops.

Why this answer

Micro-segmentation for a virtualized workload is best enforced at the hypervisor virtual switch layer using a distributed virtual firewall (e.g., VMware NSX Distributed Firewall, Cisco ACI/AVS). This places the enforcement point directly on the vNIC of the database VM, so policy follows the workload regardless of physical topology, and east-west traffic between VMs on the same host is filtered without hairpinning to a physical appliance. This provides optimal granularity and performance.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that a perimeter or core firewall can enforce micro-segmentation — candidates miss that east-west traffic between VMs on the same host bypasses physical firewalls entirely.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because DNS sinkholing redirects name resolution to a blackhole — it does not enforce L3/L4 access control and can be bypassed by direct IP connections. Option B is wrong because a core router ACL filters at the data center gateway, which is too coarse and does not control intra-host east-west traffic between VMs. Option D is wrong because a perimeter firewall only sees north-south traffic entering/leaving the data center, not inter-VM traffic within the virtualized environment.

16
MCQhard

A security engineer is evaluating a network intrusion prevention system (NIPS) that must inspect traffic flowing between two internal VLANs at 10 Gbps. The requirement is to detect and block exploits without introducing asymmetric routing, and the device must remain transparent to Layer 2 and Layer 3 topologies. Which deployment mode should the engineer choose?

A.TAP aggregation with out-of-band correlation only
B.Passive SPAN port monitoring with TCP reset injection
C.Inline routed mode with each interface on a different subnet
D.Inline transparent mode using a Layer 2 bridge with fail-open bypass
AnswerD

Inline transparent mode bridges two interfaces at Layer 2, so the NIPS inspects and can drop malicious frames without changing IP addressing or routing. Fail-open bypass maintains connectivity if the device fails. This matches the need to block exploits, avoid asymmetric routing, and remain transparent to Layer 2 and Layer 3 topologies, making it the correct deployment mode for this scenario.

Why this answer

Inline transparent mode with a Layer 2 bridge allows the NIPS to inspect and drop malicious traffic while remaining invisible to Layer 2 and Layer 3 addressing and routing. Fail-open bypass preserves availability if the device fails. Passive, TAP, and routed inline modes either cannot block reliably or alter the network topology, so they do not meet the transparency and prevention requirements.

Exam trap

The trap here is assuming that a passive SPAN or TAP deployment can block attacks simply because it detects them.

17
Multi-Selectmedium

A network engineer is configuring IPsec site-to-site VPN policies. During Phase 2 negotiations, which TWO parameters must match identically on both VPN peers for the security association (SA) to establish successfully? (Choose two)

Select 2 answers
A.The physical interface speed (e.g., 1 Gbps vs 10 Gbps) of the WAN ports
B.IPsec Encapsulation Mode (Tunnel mode or Transport mode)
C.The local device hostname configured in the router's global configuration
D.The SNMP community string configured on the management plane
E.IPsec Transform Set (Encryption and Integrity algorithms, e.g., AES-256 and SHA-256)
AnswersB, E

Phase 2 requires both peers to agree the same encapsulation mode; mismatched tunnel versus transport mode causes the SA proposal to fail, so identical mode selection is mandatory for the IPsec security association to establish.

Why this answer

Option B is correct because the IPsec encapsulation mode (Tunnel mode or Transport mode) is part of the Phase 2 SA proposal and must match identically on both peers; a mismatch causes the quick mode negotiation to fail. Option E is correct because the IPsec transform set defines the encryption algorithm (e.g., AES-256) and integrity/hash algorithm (e.g., SHA-256) used to protect the data, and both peers must agree on the exact same transform set for the Phase 2 SA to establish. Option A is incorrect because physical interface speed is a Layer 1 characteristic and has no bearing on IPsec Phase 2 parameter matching.

Option C is incorrect because the local hostname is a device identifier used for management and IKE identity in some configurations, but it is not a Phase 2 SA parameter that must match. Option D is incorrect because the SNMP community string is a management-plane setting unrelated to IPsec Phase 2 negotiation.

Exam trap

CND often tests whether candidates confuse Phase 1 (IKE) parameters like authentication method and DH group with Phase 2 (IPsec) parameters like transform set and encapsulation mode.

18
Multi-Selecthard

A security analyst is investigating a compromised network segment and discovers that an attacker bypassed network perimeter access controls by tunneling malicious command-and-control traffic through allowed protocols. Which THREE protocols are most commonly abused for covert data exfiltration and tunneling through corporate firewalls? (Choose three)

Select 3 answers
A.ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol)
B.HTTPS / TLS (Port 443)
C.BGP (Border Gateway Protocol, Port 179)
D.DNS (Port 53)
E.RIP (Routing Information Protocol, UDP Port 520)
AnswersA, B, D

ICMP carries payloads inside echo request and reply packets, which most firewalls permit for troubleshooting, so attackers tunnel command-and-control data without opening ports. Its lack of TCP or UDP port numbers means perimeter rules filtering on ports cannot inspect or block the covert channel, directly satisfying the stem's requirement for abuse of allowed protocols.

Why this answer

ICMP (A) is correct because attackers commonly tunnel data inside ICMP echo request/reply payloads (e.g., icmptunnel, ptunnel), and many firewalls permit ping for troubleshooting, making it a classic covert channel. HTTPS/TLS on port 443 (B) is correct because encrypted web traffic is almost universally allowed outbound, so C2 traffic blends into normal TLS sessions and cannot be inspected without TLS interception, making it the most prevalent exfiltration channel. DNS on port 53 (D) is correct because DNS queries and responses are typically permitted for name resolution, and attackers abuse it via DNS tunneling tools (e.g., iodine, dnscat2) using TXT, NULL, or CNAME records to carry data.

BGP (C) is not a typical covert channel for a compromised host segment; it is a routing protocol between autonomous systems on port 179, and RIP (E) is a legacy interior routing protocol on UDP 520, neither of which is commonly abused for host-level C2 tunneling through perimeter firewalls.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that any protocol allowed through the firewall can be abused for tunneling, leading candidates to select routing protocols like BGP or RIP, which are not typically permitted inbound and lack host-level tunneling mechanisms.

19
MCQeasy

A network administrator is setting up a secure remote management channel for Linux servers across the public internet. The security policy mandates that Telnet must not be used. Which protocol should be implemented?

A.SSH (Secure Shell)
B.HTTP
C.SNMPv1
D.FTP
AnswerA

SSH encrypts the entire remote management session, including authentication credentials and commands, over the public internet. Telnet transmits these in cleartext, so SSH satisfies the policy mandate prohibiting Telnet while providing secure remote administration of the Linux servers.

Why this answer

SSH (Secure Shell) is the standard protocol for secure remote management of Linux servers, providing encrypted authentication and session transport over untrusted networks. It replaces insecure protocols like Telnet by encrypting all traffic, including credentials and commands. SSH operates on TCP port 22 by default and supports key-based authentication for stronger security.

Exam trap

CND often tests the confusion between secure and insecure remote management protocols, causing candidates to select SNMPv1 or FTP because they are familiar network protocols, even though they lack encryption and do not provide secure shell access.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option B is wrong because HTTP is an unencrypted web protocol that does not provide secure remote shell access and transmits data in cleartext. Option C is wrong because SNMPv1 is an unencrypted network management protocol used for monitoring and configuration, not for interactive remote shell sessions, and it has weak security (community strings in cleartext). Option D is wrong because FTP is an unencrypted file transfer protocol that transmits credentials and data in cleartext, and it does not provide remote shell access.

20
MCQhard

A network administrator is configuring a high-availability pair of firewalls in active/passive mode using virtual router redundancy protocol (VRRP). During a failover event, active TCP sessions drop, forcing users to re-authenticate to internal applications. Which firewall feature must be enabled to maintain stateful session continuity across the failover?

A.Network Address Translation (NAT) pool overloading
B.Asymmetric routing bypass mode
C.Stateful session synchronization (State Sync / HA heartbeat link)
D.Dynamic DNS update propagation
AnswerC

Stateful session synchronisation replicates the connection table, including TCP sequence numbers and authentication state, from the active firewall to the passive peer over the HA heartbeat link. This satisfies the stem's requirement to maintain session continuity during VRRP failover, so users avoid re-authenticating to internal applications.

Why this answer

Stateful session synchronization replicates the connection state table between the active and standby firewalls over the HA heartbeat/sync link, so that when failover occurs the standby already knows about every established TCP session. This preserves sequence numbers, session timers, and NAT translations, allowing existing sessions to continue without forcing users to re-authenticate. VRRP handles the virtual IP failover, but it does not carry session state — that is the job of state sync.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that VRRP or HSRP alone provides session continuity — candidates forget that VRRP only moves the virtual IP, while a separate state-sync mechanism is required to preserve established connections.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because NAT pool overloading (PAT) is about sharing a single public IP across many internal hosts; it does not synchronize session state and is unrelated to HA failover continuity. Option B is wrong because 'asymmetric routing bypass mode' is not a real feature that maintains state — asymmetric routing is a problem to be solved, not a solution, and bypassing stateful inspection would defeat the firewall's purpose. Option D is wrong because Dynamic DNS update propagation only affects name resolution after an IP change; it has no bearing on preserving TCP session state across a firewall failover.

21
MCQhard

A security architect is designing a high-security DMZ architecture. Public-facing web servers must be isolated from the internal database servers, and an intermediary inspection zone is required. Which design pattern should the architect implement?

A.Three-legged firewall architecture creating separate internal, external, and DMZ zones
B.Placing all web and database servers on the same internal VLAN protected by host firewalls
C.Single-firewall dual-homed architecture with a software loopback filter
D.Direct flat bridging between the external router and the internal core switch
AnswerA

A three-legged firewall uses three distinct physical or logical interfaces to isolate the internal network, external network, and DMZ into separate security zones.

Why this answer

A three-legged firewall architecture (also called a tri-homed firewall) uses three separate network interfaces to create distinct security zones: external (internet), internal (trusted LAN), and DMZ (public-facing services). This enforces segmentation so that compromised public web servers in the DMZ cannot directly reach internal database servers, and all traffic between zones must pass through the firewall's inspection policy. It directly satisfies the requirement for an intermediary inspection zone between public web servers and internal databases.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that a dual-homed firewall plus a host-based filter provides equivalent segmentation to a true three-legged DMZ design — candidates pick the 'simpler' dual-homed option without recognizing it cannot create a third isolated zone.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option B is wrong because placing web and database servers on the same internal VLAN eliminates network segmentation, so a web server compromise gives attackers a direct Layer 2 path to the database servers regardless of host firewalls. Option C is wrong because a dual-homed firewall only provides two interfaces (external and internal), so it cannot create a separate DMZ inspection zone — the loopback filter is a host-level control, not a zone separation mechanism. Option D is wrong because flat bridging between the external router and internal core switch bypasses all firewall inspection entirely, merging the untrusted and trusted networks into one broadcast domain.

22
MCQhard

A security engineer is configuring a Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW) to perform deep packet inspection (DPI) on encrypted TLS traffic. Due to privacy regulations, specific internal banking applications must be excluded from SSL decryption. How should the engineer configure the firewall to bypass decryption for these specific destinations without disabling overall inspection?

A.Create an outbound NAT rule mapping banking IP addresses to a loopback interface.
B.Configure a static route directing banking traffic through an uninspected bypass interface.
C.Configure a Decryption Exclusion / Bypass rule for specific trusted destination URL categories or domains
D.Disable all Layer 7 application inspection signatures globally for TCP port 443.
AnswerC

A decryption exclusion or bypass rule scoped to specific trusted destinations lets the NGFW skip TLS interception for those banking applications while continuing DPI elsewhere. This satisfies the privacy constraint without disabling inspection globally, preserving visibility for all other traffic.

Why this answer

Configuring a Decryption Exclusion or Bypass rule for specific trusted destination URL categories or domains allows the NGFW to skip SSL decryption for those destinations while continuing to decrypt and inspect all other TLS traffic. This satisfies privacy regulations without disabling overall inspection.

Exam trap

The trap is assuming that any rule affecting traffic flow (NAT, routing) can bypass decryption, when only specific decryption exclusion policies achieve selective SSL bypass without disabling global inspection.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because NAT rules affect addressing, not decryption policy, and would not bypass SSL inspection. Option B is wrong because static routes control path selection, not inspection behavior, and an 'uninspected bypass interface' is not a standard decryption bypass mechanism. Option D is wrong because disabling all Layer 7 inspection for port 443 globally would eliminate inspection for all TLS traffic, violating the requirement to maintain overall inspection.

23
Multi-Selecthard

A network administrator is implementing defense-in-depth measures against ARP spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks on a Cisco switched enterprise network. Which THREE switch security features should be enabled on access layer ports? (Choose three)

Select 3 answers
A.DHCP Snooping
B.Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)
C.EtherChannel load balancing using source-destination MAC hashing
D.IP Source Guard
E.Port Aggregation Protocol (PAgP)
AnswersA, B, D

DHCP Snooping builds the trusted binding table of IP, MAC, and port mappings, and marks uplinks trusted while blocking rogue DHCP servers. It supplies the prerequisite data DAI and IP Source Guard rely on, countering the spoofing described in the stem.

Why this answer

DHCP Snooping (A) is correct because it builds and maintains the trusted DHCP snooping binding table (IP-to-MAC-to-VLAN-to-port mappings) that DAI and IP Source Guard rely on, and it blocks rogue DHCP servers by rate-limiting and trusting only uplink ports. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) (B) is correct because it intercepts ARP packets on untrusted access ports and validates them against the DHCP snooping binding table (or static ARP ACLs), dropping ARP spoofing attempts that enable man-in-the-middle attacks. IP Source Guard (D) is correct because it uses the DHCP snooping binding table to filter traffic on access ports, permitting only frames whose source IP and source MAC match the binding entry, which prevents IP/MAC spoofing at Layer 2.

EtherChannel load balancing with source-destination MAC hashing (C) is not a security feature; it only affects how traffic is distributed across bundled links and provides no protection against ARP spoofing. PAgP (E) is a Cisco-proprietary link aggregation negotiation protocol for forming EtherChannels and likewise offers no defense against ARP spoofing or MITM attacks.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that link aggregation or load balancing features provide security against ARP spoofing, when only DHCP Snooping, DAI, and IP Source Guard are the correct defense-in-depth trio.

24
Multi-Selecthard

A security team is conducting a penetration test against a corporate network and attempts a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack using ICMP redirection and IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) spoofing. Which THREE network controls effectively mitigate these specific local network redirection attacks? (Choose three)

Select 3 answers
A.Disabling ICMP redirect processing on host operating systems and core routers
B.Enabling IPv6 RA Guard on switch access ports to drop rogue router advertisements
C.Enabling Spanning Tree PortFast across all trunk ports
D.Enabling SNMPv1 community strings on all perimeter routing devices
E.Implementing source address validation and uRPF (Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding)
AnswersA, B, E

Disabling ICMP redirect processing stops hosts and routers accepting Redirect messages that instruct them to alter their routing path. This directly defeats the ICMP redirection half of the MitM attempt, preventing an attacker from persuading victims to route traffic through their machine.

Why this answer

Option A is correct because disabling ICMP redirect processing on hosts and routers prevents an attacker from using forged ICMP redirect messages to alter a victim's routing table and insert themselves as a man-in-the-middle. Option B is correct because IPv6 RA Guard on switch access ports filters and drops rogue Router Advertisement messages, blocking the RA spoofing vector used to hijack the default gateway. Option E is correct because source address validation and uRPF (Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding) drop packets whose source addresses do not match the expected inbound path, making it harder for an attacker to spoof addresses needed for these redirection attacks.

Option C is not appropriate because Spanning Tree PortFast is a Layer 2 convergence feature and does not mitigate ICMP redirect or IPv6 RA spoofing, and enabling it on trunk ports can even cause loops. Option D is incorrect because SNMPv1 community strings are weak management credentials and do not provide any protection against local network redirection attacks.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that Spanning Tree features or SNMP hardening mitigate Layer 3 redirection attacks, when the exam expects first-hop security controls like RA Guard, ICMP redirect suppression, and uRPF.

25
Multi-Selectmedium

A network administrator is configuring secure remote access for employees. The security policy mandates that the remote access solution must support multi-factor authentication (MFA) and encrypt all traffic from the client device. Which TWO technologies or protocols can meet these requirements? (Choose two)

Select 2 answers
A.Unencrypted Telnet management session over port 23
B.Unauthenticated PPTP remote dial-up connection
C.SSL/TLS-based VPN (e.g., OpenVPN or AnyConnect) integrated with an identity provider for MFA
D.Standard HTTP web browsing to internal unencrypted portals
E.IPsec VPN client software configured with IKEv2 and certificate/MFA authentication
AnswersC, E

SSL/TLS VPNs tunnel traffic over TCP or UDP port 443, encrypting all client traffic, while integration with an identity provider enables MFA enforcement at authentication. This meets the policy's dual requirements of MFA support and full traffic encryption without requiring certificate infrastructure.

Why this answer

Option C is correct because an SSL/TLS-based VPN such as OpenVPN or Cisco AnyConnect encrypts all client traffic through a TLS tunnel and can be integrated with an identity provider (e.g., RADIUS, SAML, or LDAP) to enforce multi-factor authentication before granting access. Option E is correct because an IPsec VPN client using IKEv2 provides strong encryption of all traffic and supports certificate-based authentication combined with MFA (for example, EAP-MSCHAPv2 plus a one-time token), satisfying both the encryption and MFA mandates. Option A is wrong because Telnet on port 23 transmits credentials and session data in cleartext and offers no MFA.

Option B is wrong because PPTP is cryptographically broken and unauthenticated dial-up does not provide MFA or reliable encryption. Option D is wrong because standard HTTP to internal portals is unencrypted and does not itself enforce MFA or encrypt all client traffic.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that any 'VPN' or 'secure' protocol automatically includes MFA and strong encryption, when in fact PPTP and unauthenticated dial-up fail both criteria, and Telnet/HTTP fail encryption entirely.

26
MCQmedium

An enterprise network uses an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) deployed in passive monitoring mode via a switch span port. The security operations center (SOC) notices that the IDS generates high volumes of alerts for internal vulnerability scanning activities, obscuring real attacks. Which network design modification should be implemented to reduce false positive alert fatigue without disabling the detection signatures?

A.Upgrade the IDS hardware to process higher bandwidth capacity
B.Convert the IDS into an inline IPS
C.Tune the IDS sensor signature policies to exclude the internal vulnerability scanner's source IP addresses
D.Move the IDS from a switch SPAN port to an inline routing position
AnswerC

Suppressing alerts by source IP removes the scanner's noise while leaving every detection signature active for genuine threats, directly cutting false positive fatigue. This satisfies the stem's constraint of reducing alert volume without disabling signatures, since the exclusion targets a known benign origin rather than the detection logic itself.

Why this answer

Tuning the IDS signature policies to exclude the internal vulnerability scanner's source IP addresses suppresses alerts generated by authorized scanning activity while keeping all detection signatures active for real threats. This directly reduces false positive fatigue without weakening the IDS's ability to detect actual attacks.

Exam trap

The trap here is confusing performance tuning (hardware, inline conversion) with alert tuning (signature exclusions), leading candidates to pick options that change deployment mode rather than filter noise.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because upgrading hardware addresses performance/throughput, not alert relevance or false positives. Option B is wrong because converting to inline IPS changes the deployment mode and could block legitimate traffic, but does not reduce false positives from internal scans. Option D is wrong because moving to an inline routing position changes traffic flow and may introduce latency or blocking, but does not filter out scanner-generated alerts.

27
MCQmedium

An organization's security policy requires that all remote workers connect to the corporate network via a VPN that routes all client internet traffic through the corporate data center security stack. Which type of VPN architecture must the remote client be configured to use?

A.Clientless SSL VPN
B.Full-tunnel VPN
C.Split-tunnel VPN
D.Transport mode IPsec VPN
AnswerB

Full-tunnel VPN captures every packet from the client, including internet-bound traffic, and forwards it through the VPN gateway to the corporate data centre, where the security stack inspects it. This directly satisfies the policy's requirement that all remote-worker internet traffic traverse the corporate security controls rather than egressing locally.

Why this answer

A full-tunnel VPN routes all client traffic — including internet-bound traffic — through the VPN tunnel to the corporate data center, where it is inspected by the security stack before reaching the internet. This ensures consistent policy enforcement and prevents split-tunnel bypass. Split-tunnel VPN, by contrast, sends only corporate traffic through the tunnel while internet traffic goes directly.

Exam trap

CND often tests the confusion between full-tunnel and split-tunnel VPNs, causing candidates to select split-tunnel when the requirement is to route all traffic through the corporate security stack, or to confuse clientless SSL VPN with full network access.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because a clientless SSL VPN provides browser-based access to specific web applications without a full network tunnel, and does not route all internet traffic through the corporate stack. Option C is wrong because split-tunnel VPN deliberately sends only corporate traffic through the tunnel, leaving internet traffic to go directly, which violates the requirement. Option D is wrong because Transport mode IPsec VPN encrypts only the payload and is typically used for host-to-host or endpoint-to-endpoint scenarios, not for full-tunnel remote access routing all traffic.

28
MCQeasy

An organization wants to deploy a wireless intrusion prevention system (WIPS) sensor to detect unauthorized access points and rogue devices broadcasting corporate SSIDs. Where should the WIPS sensor be deployed?

A.Installed directly on the core router's uplink interface facing the ISP
B.Configured as a virtual machine inside the cloud data center hypervisor cluster
C.Attached as a tap on the primary corporate database server's storage area network (SAN)
D.Distributed across the physical office space as dedicated RF monitoring sensors or dual-band access points
AnswerD

WIPS sensors must sit within radio range of the monitored airspace to capture rogue frames and unauthorised SSIDs. Distributing dedicated RF sensors or dual-band access points across the office provides the coverage needed to detect and contain rogue devices.

Why this answer

A WIPS sensor must monitor the RF (radio frequency) spectrum to detect rogue APs, evil twins, and unauthorized devices broadcasting corporate SSIDs. Deploying dedicated RF sensors or dual-band APs throughout the physical office space ensures full wireless coverage and accurate detection. Wired or virtual placements cannot see over-the-air threats.

Exam trap

CND often tests the physical-layer requirement of wireless monitoring — candidates pick virtual or wired placements because they sound 'centralized,' forgetting that RF threats can only be detected by sensors with antennas in the coverage area.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because a sensor on the core router's ISP uplink monitors wired traffic, not wireless RF signals, so it cannot detect rogue APs or SSID spoofing. Option B is wrong because a VM inside a cloud hypervisor has no physical RF interface and cannot monitor wireless spectrum in the office. Option C is wrong because a tap on a SAN monitors storage traffic, which is entirely unrelated to wireless intrusion detection.

29
MCQhard

An organization implements IEEE 802.1X port-based authentication across its enterprise switch infrastructure. A new IP security camera is connected to a switch port, but it does not support 802.1X supplicant software. How should the network administrator configure the switch port to authenticate and isolate the camera securely?

A.Configure the port as an 802.1X trunk port with automatic supplicant fallback enabled.
B.Place the port in an open dynamic VLAN using unauthenticated guest access without any RADIUS lookup.
C.Disable spanning-tree protocol (STP) on the port to allow unauthenticated legacy device association.
D.Configure MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB) with a specific device profiling and authorization profile on the RADIUS server.
AnswerD

MAC Authentication Bypass lets the switch authenticate the camera by its MAC address against the RADIUS server without supplicant software. Pairing MAB with device profiling and a specific authorisation profile ensures the camera is identified and placed into an isolated, restricted VLAN rather than granted broad access.

Why this answer

MAC Authentication Bypass (MAB) is the correct solution because it allows the switch to authenticate devices that lack an 802.1X supplicant by using the device's MAC address as the credential against the RADIUS server. Combined with device profiling and an authorization profile, the camera can be placed into a restricted VLAN or given limited ACLs, achieving both authentication and isolation. This is the standard Cisco ISE/switch design pattern for headless devices like cameras, printers, and IoT sensors.

Exam trap

CND often tests whether candidates confuse MAB (MAC-based authentication for headless devices) with guest VLANs or 802.1X fallback, causing them to pick an unauthenticated option that fails the 'securely isolate' requirement.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because 802.1X does not support 'automatic supplicant fallback' on a trunk port; trunk ports are for switch-to-switch links and would not authenticate an endpoint camera. Option B is wrong because placing the port in an open guest VLAN without RADIUS lookup provides no authentication and no isolation — it is effectively an open port, violating the security requirement. Option C is wrong because disabling STP has nothing to do with authentication and would introduce Layer 2 loop risks; STP is a loop-prevention protocol, not an access control mechanism.

30
MCQeasy

An enterprise network uses VLANs to separate departments. Users in the Marketing VLAN need to access a printer located in the Sales VLAN. Which network device is strictly required to route traffic between these two distinct VLANs?

A.Layer 2 unmanaged switch
B.Layer 3 router or multilayer switch
C.Hub
D.Wireless range extender
AnswerB

Traffic between distinct VLANs requires Layer 3 forwarding, since VLANs are separate broadcast domains and Layer 2 switching alone cannot cross them. A Layer 3 router or multilayer switch with inter-VLAN routing configured is therefore strictly required to move packets between the Marketing and Sales VLANs.

Why this answer

VLANs are logically separate Layer 2 broadcast domains, so traffic between the Marketing VLAN and the Sales VLAN cannot be switched at Layer 2 — it must be routed. A Layer 3 router or multilayer switch performs inter-VLAN routing by terminating each VLAN's SVI (or subinterface) and forwarding packets between the two IP subnets. This is the only device class in the options that operates at Layer 3 and can make forwarding decisions based on IP addressing.

Exam trap

The trap here is assuming that because a switch 'connects' devices, a Layer 2 switch can move traffic between VLANs — candidates forget that VLANs are separate broadcast domains requiring Layer 3 routing.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option A is wrong because a Layer 2 unmanaged switch only forwards frames within a single broadcast domain and has no IP routing capability, so it cannot move traffic between two VLANs. Option C is wrong because a hub is a Layer 1 repeater that floods all frames out every port with no VLAN awareness or routing logic whatsoever. Option D is wrong because a wireless range extender merely rebroadcasts Wi-Fi signals at Layer 1/2 and provides no inter-VLAN routing function.

31
MCQeasy

An administrator needs to secure SNMP traffic on enterprise network switches so that management queries and responses are both encrypted and authenticated. Which version of SNMP must be configured?

A.SNMPv3
B.SNMPv2c
C.SNMPv1
D.SNMPv2u
AnswerA

SNMPv3 adds the User-based Security Model, providing both authentication (MD5 or SHA) and encryption (DES or AES) of management queries and responses. SNMPv1 and v2c transmit community strings in cleartext, so neither meets the encryption and authentication requirement.

Why this answer

SNMPv3 is the only version that provides both encryption (via DES, 3DES, AES) and authentication (via MD5, SHA). It introduces the User-based Security Model (USM) to secure management queries and responses. SNMPv1 and v2c offer only community string authentication, which is sent in cleartext.

Exam trap

CND often tests the misconception that SNMPv2c provides encryption because it has 'v2' in the name, but only SNMPv3 offers both authentication and encryption.

How to eliminate wrong answers

Option B is wrong because SNMPv2c uses community strings for authentication, which are transmitted in plaintext and provide no encryption. Option C is wrong because SNMPv1 also uses plaintext community strings and lacks encryption and strong authentication. Option D is wrong because SNMPv2u is a proposed variant that offers authentication but not encryption, and it was never widely adopted.

32
Multi-Selecthard

A security engineer is performing a security audit of an enterprise firewall and discovers several misconfigurations. Which THREE of the following practices represent severe security vulnerabilities in firewall deployment? (Choose three)

Select 3 answers
A.Configuring a default 'any-any-allow' rule at the bottom of the security policy rulebase without logging
B.Exposing the firewall management GUI/SSH interface directly to the public internet without a VPN or source IP restriction
C.Enabling stateful inspection on all internal DMZ interfaces
D.Implementing strict reverse path forwarding (RPF) checks on external interfaces
E.Leaving default factory administrator usernames and passwords active on the device
AnswersA, B, E

An unlogged any-any-allow rule at the bottom permits all traffic the preceding rules did not match, silently defeating the default-deny posture. This satisfies the stem's severe-vulnerability criterion because the absence of logging hides that permissive fallthrough from monitoring, audit and incident detection entirely.

Why this answer

Option A is correct because a default 'any-any-allow' rule at the bottom of the rulebase silently permits all traffic that fails to match earlier rules, effectively negating the firewall's deny-by-default posture, and the absence of logging removes any audit trail or detection capability. Option B is correct because exposing the management GUI/SSH directly to the internet without a VPN or source IP restriction gives attackers a reachable authentication surface for brute-force, credential-stuffing, and exploitation of management-plane vulnerabilities, violating the principle of out-of-band, restricted administrative access. Option E is correct because leaving factory default administrator usernames and passwords active allows trivial unauthorized access using publicly documented credentials, leading to full device compromise and policy manipulation.

Option C does not belong because enabling stateful inspection on internal DMZ interfaces is a recommended, security-enhancing practice, not a vulnerability. Option D does not belong because strict reverse path forwarding on external interfaces is a legitimate anti-spoofing control that mitigates IP spoofing and asymmetric routing attacks.

Exam trap

CND often tests whether candidates can distinguish hardening controls (stateful inspection, RPF) from actual vulnerabilities — the trap is picking security best practices as 'misconfigurations' because they sound restrictive.

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