A security administrator is configuring a corporate proxy server (Squid) to inspect outbound HTTPS traffic from endpoints. To perform SSL interception (Man-in-the-Middle inspection) for content filtering and DLP, what cryptographic setup must be installed on client workstations?
SSL interception requires the proxy to re-sign traffic with its own certificate, so clients must trust that issuing CA. Installing the proxy's custom Root CA into the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store lets workstations accept the forged certificates without warnings.
Why this answer
For SSL interception, the Squid proxy generates a forged certificate for each HTTPS site on the fly, signed by its own internal Root CA. For clients to trust these forged certificates without warnings, the proxy's Root CA certificate must be installed in each workstation's Trusted Root Certification Authorities store. This establishes a chain of trust so browsers accept the intercepted TLS sessions transparently.
Exam trap
The trap is thinking the proxy's server certificate or the destination site's public key must be installed, when in fact the trust anchor (Root CA) that signs the dynamically generated leaf certificates is what clients must trust.
How to eliminate wrong answers
Option B is wrong because installing every external website's public key is impractical and technically meaningless — public keys are already presented during the TLS handshake and are not what clients need to trust the proxy. Option C is wrong because SSLv2 is deprecated and insecure, and an expired certificate bundle would cause trust failures rather than enable interception. Option D is wrong because SSH host keys are used for SSH server authentication, not for TLS/HTTPS interception, and are unrelated to the X.509 trust model browsers use.