Question 131 of 1,013
How to Segment a Web Application with DMZ and Internal Zones
A small enterprise is rebuilding its public customer portal. The web front end must be reachable from the internet, the application tier should never be directly exposed, and the database must remain private even if the web server is compromised. Which two design changes best meet those goals? Select two.
Quick Answer
The answer is to place the application tier on an internal subnet and allow only the web front end to reach it on the app port, while placing the web front end in a DMZ behind a firewall rule permitting only HTTPS from the internet. This design enforces network segmentation by creating a DMZ for the public-facing web server, ensuring the application and database layers remain in internal zones with no direct internet exposure. Even if the web server is compromised, the database stays private because the application tier is isolated on a separate internal subnet with strictly controlled east-west traffic. On the Security+ SY0-701 exam, this scenario tests your understanding of layered defense and DMZ architecture, often appearing as a multi-select question where a common trap is to place the database in the DMZ or allow direct app-tier access. Remember the memory tip: “Web in the DMZ, app inside, DB hidden—three layers, one breach won’t win.”
⚠ Common exam trap
Many exam-takers assume placing the database on the same subnet as the web server improves performance (Option B) without recognizing that it sacrifices security isolation, which is the primary goal in this scenario.
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.
Correct answer & explanation
✓
Place the web front end in a DMZ behind a firewall rule allowing only HTTPS from the internet.
Placing the web front end in a DMZ behind a firewall rule that permits only HTTPS (TCP/443) from the internet ensures the public-facing component is isolated from internal networks. This design prevents direct inbound access to the application or database tiers, reducing the attack surface while still allowing legitimate web traffic.
Answer analysis
Option-by-option breakdown
For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.
- ✓
Place the web front end in a DMZ behind a firewall rule allowing only HTTPS from the internet.
Why this is correct
A DMZ is the correct place for the internet-facing web front end because it limits exposure if the server is attacked. Allowing only HTTPS from the internet reduces unnecessary access and supports a tight inbound filtering strategy. This choice fits a common secure web architecture pattern and keeps the higher-value internal systems separate from direct public reach.
- ✗
Put the database on the same subnet as the web front end so internal calls have lower latency.
Why it's wrong here
Putting the database on the same subnet increases blast radius and exposes sensitive data to a broader set of compromises. Lower latency is not a security justification when the design goal is isolation. The database should remain in a separate internal zone with tightly controlled access, not share the same network segment as the public-facing server.
- ✓
Place the application tier on an internal subnet and allow only the web front end to reach it on the app port.
Why this is correct
Keeping the application tier on an internal subnet creates a protective boundary between public and internal components. Limiting access so only the web front end can reach the app port reduces attack paths and enforces segmentation. This design supports defense in depth because each tier can only communicate with the layer that truly needs it.
- ✗
Allow the database to accept connections from the internet if strong passwords are used.
Why it's wrong here
Direct internet exposure of a database is a poor design choice even when passwords are strong. Passwords alone do not prevent scanning, exploit attempts, or credential stuffing against the service. The database should be isolated behind internal controls and reachable only from approved application components, not from external networks.
- ✗
Disable all inbound filtering on the DMZ so troubleshooting is simpler.
Why it's wrong here
Removing inbound filtering defeats the purpose of a DMZ and greatly increases risk. Troubleshooting convenience is not a valid reason to expose services broadly. A secure design keeps only the necessary ports open and uses logging, documentation, and controlled rules to support administration without weakening security boundaries.
About these practice questions
Courseiva creates original exam-style practice questions with explanations and wrong-answer analysis. It does not publish real exam questions, exam dumps, or protected exam content. Learn why practice questions differ from exam dumps →
Same concept, more angles
2 more ways this is tested on SY0-701
These questions test the same concept from different angles. Work through them to make sure you can recognise it however the exam phrases it.
Variation 1. An online retailer is redesigning a network for a public web app. Customers must reach only the web tier from the internet. The web tier must reach the application tier, and the application tier must reach the database tier. Which two design changes best support this zoning model? Select two.
medium- A.Place all three server tiers on the same flat VLAN and rely on host firewalls.
- ✓ B.Put the internet-facing web tier in a DMZ with tightly filtered inbound rules.
- C.Give the database server a public IP address so the web tier can connect faster.
- ✓ D.Place the application and database tiers in separate internal zones with firewall allow-lists between them.
- E.Use a single NAT device for all servers and disable interserver filtering.
Why B: Placing the internet-facing web tier in a DMZ (demilitarized zone) with tightly filtered inbound rules ensures that external users can only reach the web servers, while the DMZ network isolates them from internal tiers. This aligns with the principle of defense in depth, where the DMZ acts as a buffer zone, and inbound rules (e.g., allowing only TCP/443 for HTTPS) minimize the attack surface. The web tier can then initiate outbound connections to the application tier through a firewall with specific allow-lists, maintaining strict segmentation.
Variation 2. An online retailer is moving its public web app, internal API, and database into separate zones. Public users must reach only the web tier. The web tier must contact the app tier, and only the app tier may query the database. Admins should manage all servers from a hardened jump host. Which design best meets these goals and minimizes lateral movement?
hard- A.Place all servers in one VLAN and rely on host-based firewalls to block unwanted traffic.
- ✓ B.Create separate DMZ, application, and database zones with default-deny east-west rules and use a jump host for administration.
- C.Put the database in the DMZ so the web tier can connect to it without extra firewall rules.
- D.Expose the application tier to the Internet and use NAT to hide the database subnet.
Why B: It implements a multi-tier network architecture with separate DMZ, application, and database zones, enforcing default-deny east-west traffic rules. This ensures that public users can only reach the web tier, the web tier can only communicate with the app tier, and only the app tier can query the database, while all administrative access is funneled through a hardened jump host, which minimizes lateral movement by restricting inter-zone traffic to only what is explicitly required.
Last reviewed: Jun 11, 2026
This SY0-701 practice question is part of Courseiva's free CompTIA certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the SY0-701 exam.
Question Discussion
Share a tip, memory trick, or ask about the reasoning behind this question. Do not post real exam questions, leaked content, braindumps, or copyrighted exam material. Comments are moderated and may be removed without notice.
Sign in to join the discussion.