CAS-004 Security Architecture Practice Question
An organization is deploying containerized applications and needs to enforce security policies that restrict the system calls a container can make. Which Linux security module should be used?
⚠ Common exam trap
CAS-005 often tests the distinction between seccomp (syscall filtering) and other Linux security modules like AppArmor or SELinux (access control), causing candidates to confuse the layer of enforcement.
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.
Correct answer & explanation
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seccomp
seccomp (secure computing mode) is a Linux kernel feature that filters system calls made by a process. In container security, seccomp profiles define which syscalls a containerized process can invoke, directly restricting its ability to interact with the kernel. This is the primary mechanism used by container runtimes like Docker and containerd to enforce syscall-level restrictions.
Answer analysis
Option-by-option breakdown
For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.
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seccomp
Why this is correct
seccomp operates as a syscall filter, restricting which system calls a process may invoke. Applied to containers, it blocks dangerous calls such as those used in privilege-escalation exploits, directly satisfying the requirement to limit the system calls a container can make.
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AppArmor
Why it's wrong here
AppArmor confines programs via path-based profiles, but its policy model does not expose individual system calls for granular filtering; seccomp-bpf provides that syscall-level restriction. AppArmor is tempting because it ships enabled by default on Ubuntu and hardens containers against file and capability abuse, yet it cannot satisfy a syscall allowlist requirement.
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chroot
Why it's wrong here
chroot only changes the apparent root directory for a process, offering filesystem isolation with no mechanism to intercept or filter system calls. It is tempting as a lightweight container primitive, and it would suit simple filesystem confinement, but it cannot restrict which syscalls a container invokes.
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SELinux
Why it's wrong here
SELinux enforces mandatory access control through type enforcement labels on files, processes and ports, not per-syscall filtering. It is tempting because it is the most granular MAC framework and is standard on RHEL, and it would be correct for confining container domains, but the stem requires syscall restriction that seccomp delivers.
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JA
Written and reviewed by Johnson Ajibi, MSc IT Security
Senior Network & Security Engineer · founder of Courseiva
Last reviewed September 2026 · checked against the official CompTIA exam blueprint
This CAS-005 practice question is part of Courseiva's free CompTIA certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the CAS-005 exam.