DOP-C02 Security and Compliance Practice Question
A company uses AWS Organizations with SCPs to enforce security policies. The security team needs to ensure that no IAM user or role can disable AWS CloudTrail or delete CloudTrail logs. Which TWO approaches should be combined to achieve this? (Choose TWO.)
⚠ Common exam trap
Candidates often mistake detective controls (like log validation) for preventive controls. The question specifically asks for approaches that ensure no user or role can disable or delete—this requires preventive measures that block the action entirely.
Answer choices
Why each option matters
Answer the question above first, then reveal the full breakdown to understand why each option is right or wrong.
Correct answer & explanation
✓
Use a service control policy to deny s3:DeleteObject on the CloudTrail S3 bucket.
To prevent IAM users and roles from disabling CloudTrail or deleting logs, a combination of two preventive controls is needed. Option A applies a service control policy (SCP) that denies s3:DeleteObject on the CloudTrail S3 bucket, preventing log deletion at the organizational level. Option C applies an SCP that denies cloudtrail:StopLogging and cloudtrail:DeleteTrail, preventing disabling of CloudTrail itself. Both SCPs cannot be overridden by account administrators. Option D (log file validation) is a detective control—it detects tampering or deletion after it occurs, but does not prevent the action. Options B (MFA Delete) and E (IAM policy) are weaker or can be overridden, making them less reliable for this requirement.
Answer analysis
Option-by-option breakdown
For each option: why learners choose it and why it is or isn't the right answer here.
- ✓
Use a service control policy to deny s3:DeleteObject on the CloudTrail S3 bucket.
Why this is correct
An SCP denying s3:DeleteObject on the CloudTrail bucket prevents any account within the organization from deleting or overwriting the log objects that CloudTrail writes. This augments the previous SCP by protecting the evidence trail itself, not just the trail configuration. It is a preventive control at the organizational boundary, ensuring that even an administrator who manages to disable the trail cannot destroy historical log data that would reveal the actions.
- ✗
Enable MFA Delete on the CloudTrail S3 bucket.
Why it's wrong here
Enabling MFA Delete on the CloudTrail S3 bucket adds multi-factor authentication to version-immutable operations, such as permanently deleting object versions or changing bucket versioning state. However, it does not prevent authenticated users who possess MFA credentials from deleting objects, nor does it stop anyone from calling cloudtrail:StopLogging or cloudtrail:DeleteTrail. It is a deterrent and integrity feature, not a guardrail that blocks the trail-disabling attack path.
- ✓
Apply an SCP that denies cloudtrail:StopLogging and cloudtrail:DeleteTrail for all accounts.
Why this is correct
An SCP in AWS Organizations is an account-level permission boundary that applies to all principals, including the management account root user. When you attach a policy that explicitly denies cloudtrail:StopLogging and cloudtrail:DeleteTrail, API calls to disable or remove any trail are blocked across every account governed by that SCP. This is a strong preventive control because it shields the trail from administrative accidents, malicious insiders, or compromised root credentials, and it cannot be overridden by IAM policies created inside an account.
- ✗
Enable CloudTrail log file validation.
Why it's wrong here
CloudTrail log file validation is a detective control that creates hash digest files and validates that logs were not modified or deleted after delivery. It can alert you to tampering after the event, but it does not intercept or deny malicious API actions that stop logging or delete trail resources. Since the attacker can stop the trail before any subsequent activities are logged, validation offers no immediate protection to preserve the trail's availability.
- ✗
Attach an IAM policy to all users denying cloudtrail:StopLogging.
Why it's wrong here
Attaching an IAM identity-based policy to users denies cloudtrail:StopLogging only for those specific users, but it does not apply to IAM roles, services, or the root user. Moreover, any user or role with IAM management permissions can detach, modify, or replace that policy, potentially granting themselves the right to stop the trail. This approach also fails to protect against a compromise of an administrator or a resource-based scenario, so it is not an organizational-level preventive measure.
Quick reference
AWS S3 Storage Class Comparison
| Storage Class | Min Duration | Retrieval | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| S3 Standard | None | Immediate | Frequently accessed data |
| S3 Standard-IA | 30 days | Immediate | Infrequent access, rapid retrieval |
| S3 One Zone-IA | 30 days | Immediate | Non-critical infrequent data |
| S3 Intelligent-Tiering | None | Immediate–hours | Unknown or changing access patterns |
| S3 Glacier Instant | 90 days | Milliseconds | Archive with instant retrieval |
| S3 Glacier Flexible | 90 days | Minutes–hours | Archive, flexible retrieval |
| S3 Glacier Deep Archive | 180 days | Hours | Long-term compliance archive |
Go deeper
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JA
Written by Johnson Ajibi, MSc IT Security
Senior Network & Security Engineer · founder of Courseiva
This DOP-C02 practice question is part of Courseiva's free Amazon Web Services certification practice question bank. Courseiva provides original exam-style practice questions with explanations, topic-based practice, mock exams, readiness tracking, and study analytics to help learners prepare for the DOP-C02 exam.